Improving System-On-Chip Test Networks For: Bandwidth, Security, and Power by Gupta, Saurabh
Southern Methodist University
SMU Scholar
Computer Science and Engineering Theses and
Dissertations Computer Science and Engineering
Spring 5-19-2018
Improving System-On-Chip Test Networks For:
Bandwidth, Security, and Power
Saurabh Gupta
Southern Methodist University, sgupta@smu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/engineering_compsci_etds
Part of the Computer and Systems Architecture Commons, Digital Circuits Commons,
Hardware Systems Commons, and the Other Computer Engineering Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Computer Science and Engineering at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Computer Science and Engineering Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information,
please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gupta, Saurabh, "Improving System-On-Chip Test Networks For: Bandwidth, Security, and Power" (2018). Computer Science and
Engineering Theses and Dissertations. 5.
https://scholar.smu.edu/engineering_compsci_etds/5
IMPROVING SYSTEM-ON-CHIP TEST NETWORKS FOR:
BANDWIDTH, SECURITY, AND POWER
Approved by:
Dr. Jennifer Dworak
Computer Science and Engineering
Dissertation Committee Chairperson
Dr. Daniel Engels




Computer Science and Engineering
Dr. Sukumaran Nair
Computer Science and Engineering
Dr. Kundan Nepal
School of Engineering
University of St. Thomas
IMPROVING SYSTEM-ON-CHIP TEST NETWORKS FOR:
BANDWIDTH, SECURITY, AND POWER
A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Faculty of the
Lyle School of Engineering
Southern Methodist University
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
with a
Major in Computer Engineering
by
Saurabh Gupta
M.S., Computer Engineering, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX, USA





Gupta, Saurabh M.S., Computer Engineering, Southern Methodist University, 2012
B.E., Electronics Engineering, Mumbai University, 2009
Improving System-on-Chip Test Networks for:
Bandwidth, Security, and Power
Advisor: Dr. Jennifer Dworak
Doctor of Philosophy conferred May 19, 2018
Dissertation completed May 10, 2018
Modern System-on-Chips (SoCs) provide benefits such as reduction in overall system
cost, and size, increased performance, and lower power consumption. Increasing complex-
ity of these Integrated Circuits (ICs) has resulted in a higher probability of manufacturing
defects. Manufacturing defects can result in the faulty operation of a system. Thus, it is
essential to test an IC after it is manufactured to detect any possible faults in it. These
SoCs include on-chip embedded instruments that can be used for test, debug, diagnosis, val-
idation, monitoring, characterization, configuration, or functional purposes. IEEE 1687 Std.
(IJTAG) provides a standard interface for the reconfigurable access and control of on-chip
embedded instruments. Fast, and accurate tests are very desirable to the IC manufacturers
to reduce time to market for their products.
To overcome some of the challenges associated with modern SoC testing, we designed
novel IJTAG based designs that improve the overall bandwidth, and security of the test
network. Bandwidth improvements were done using our new broadcast network design, and
Parallel-IJTAG network design. We evaluated previously proposed secure IJTAG designs
for their susceptibility to side-channel attacks, and explored mitigation strategies. Applying
test data in parallel to different SoC partitions may result in higher peak power consumption
during test compared to the functional power specifications, thus causing test slowdowns
and/or producing erroneous test results. We devised a new graph coloring algorithm which
helps in designing systems that require lower peak power consumption during SoC testing.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Embedded Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2. Motivation of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Thesis Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1. IEEE Std. 1149.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2. IEEE Std. 1687 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1. Overview of IJTAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.2. Network Instruction Bit (NIB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.3. Segment Insertion Bit (SIB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Locking Segment Insertion Bit (LSIB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. PRIOR WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1. IEEE Std. 1687 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2. Broadcasting Test Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3. Previous Broadcast Network Designs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4. Test Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4.1. Power Analysis Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4. A PARALLEL IJTAG NETWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
v
4.0.1. SIBs in Parallel-IJTAG network - I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.0.2. Parallel-SIBs (P-SIBs) in Parallel-IJTAG network - II . . . . . . . . 27
4.0.3. Parallel-IJTAG network using Addressable Parallel-SIBs . . . . . . . 29
4.1. Hybrid IJTAG Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5. PARALLEL-IJTAG SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1. Securing Parallel-IJTAG network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1.1. LSIBs in Parallel-IJTAG network - I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1.2. Locking-Parallel-SIBs (L-PSIBs) in Parallel-IJTAG network - II . . . 34
5.1.3. Cost of a Guess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1.4. Securing instrument access in a hybrid IJTAG architecture . . . . . 38
6. EFFICIENT PARALLEL TESTING: A CONFIGURABLE AND SCALABLE
BROADCAST NETWORK DESIGN USING IJTAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.1. Broadcast Network - Without Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
6.1.0.1. NIB as Partition Broadcast Control Bit (BCB) . . . . . . . 43
6.1.0.2. Broadcast Segment Insertion Bit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6.2. Broadcast Network - With Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.2.0.1. Partition Broadcast Control Bit (BCB) with locked state . 49
6.2.0.2. Cluster Broadcast Control Bit (BCB) . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6.2.1. Test Time Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
7. NEW LSIB KEY LOGIC CIRCUITS AND ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.1. Key Logic 1 – AND-tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.2. Key Logic 1b – AND-tree with randomized key bit order . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.3. Key Logic 1c – Gate-tree with Compiler Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7.4. Mitigate Power Analysis Attacks by Sharing Key Bit Flip-Flops Among
Multiple LSIBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.5. Key Logic with Programmable LSIB-Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
vi
7.6. Key Logic with Brute Force Attack Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
8. HOW TO COLOR A MAP AND SIMULTANEOUSLY REDUCE TEST POWER 68
8.1. Prior Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8.2. Background: Planar Map Coloring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.2.1. Sequential Coloring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.3. New Planar Graph Coloring Algorithm for Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment 75
8.4. SCSA Results Using New Planar Graph Coloring Algorithm . . . . . . . . 78
9. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81




2.1. JTAG architecture and interfacing of serial IJTAG network to JTAG . . . . . 10
2.2. Network Instruction Bit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3. SIB design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. Locking SIB that prevents Update from Assert/Deassert of SIB_Select . . . . 13
2.5. Example scan network with 1 LSIB and 6 key bits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1. Broadcast and daisy scan example from the IEEE Std 1687, [1, p. 232] . . . . 19
3.2. Broadcast design example with exclusive access from the IEEE Std 1687, [1,
p. 231] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1. JTAG architecture and interfacing a Parallel-IJTAG network to JTAG. . . . . 24
4.2. Simple Parallel SIBs - Flat architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3. Serial SIBs - Flat architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.4. n-bit Parallel-SIB using single update cell for an n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network 28
4.5. n-bit Addressable Parallel-SIB. Address=(10...1)n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.6. Broadcast network using Addressable-PSIBs to reduce the length of the scan
paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.7. JTAG architecture and interfacing a serial and parallel IJTAG network to JTAG 32
5.1. Locking-SIBs in a Parallel-IJTAG network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5.2. Locking-SIB using single update cell in an n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network . . . 35
5.3. TAP controller states to open an LSIB with a guess key pattern in the network. 37
viii
5.4. Steps (clock cycles) required in an attempt to open an L-PSIB in a parallel
network with its key logic in the serial network, using a guess pattern during
a random brute force attack. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.1. New IJTAG based reconfigurable broadcast network - Without hierarchy . . . 44
6.2. Modified SIB design with SIB-Lock, pipelined UpdateEn, and forced shift cell
reset for the new configurable broadcast network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6.3. SIB unlock-update operations, with and without pipelined UpdateEn . . . . . 48
6.4. New IJTAG based reconfigurable broadcast network - With hierarchy . . . . . 50
6.5. Sample IJTAG networks used in Table 6.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7.1. Key logic 1 – AND-tree. Key length = n-bits. Hamming weight = j . . . . . 56
7.2. Switching activity values and the corresponding key bit values for each bit lo-
cation of the LSIB key, obtained by applying walking-1 patterns. Hamming
weight of the LSIB key = 21. Pattern reference background = all zeros.
Circuit = Key Logic 1 – AND-tree for a single LSIB key. . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.3. Switching activity values and the corresponding key bit values for each bit lo-
cation of the LSIB key, obtained by applying walking-1 patterns. Hamming
weight of the LSIB key = 21. Reference background = all zeros. Circuit =
Key Logic 1b – AND-tree with randomized key bit order, for one LSIB key. 59
7.4. Key logic 1c – Compiler synthesized gate-tree. LSIB key length = 48-bits.
Hamming weight = j . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.5. Switching activity values and the corresponding key bit values for each bit lo-
cation of the LSIB key, obtained by applying walking-1 patterns. Hamming
weight of the LSIB key = 21. Reference background = all zeros. Circuit =
Key Logic 1c – Gate-tree with compiler optimizations, for one LSIB key. . 62
7.6. Switching activity values and the corresponding key-bitsum values for each
bit location of the LSIB keys, obtained by applying walking-1 patterns.
Hamming weights of keys: LSIB1 = 32, LSIB2 = 13, LSIB3 = 37, LSIB4
= 30. Pattern reference background = all zeros. Circuit = Key Logic 1c –
Gate-tree with compiler optimizations, for four LSIB keys. . . . . . . . . . 64
7.7. Key logic 3 – Key logic with programmable LSIB Unlock key. LSIB key length
= 48-bits. Hamming weight = j . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
ix
7.8. Circuit to detect brute force attack on LSIB key logics with shared key bit flip
flops, and gate UpdateEn signal to the Update cells holding LSIB key bits.
Key length = n-bits . Hamming weights of keys : LSIB1 = j, LSIB2 = k,
LSIB3 = l, LSIB4 = m, redundant key = z. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8.1. Staggered Test Clocks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
8.2. Colored partitions on an SoC – Colors here represent the stagger values used
for Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
8.3. Planar graph Obtained from the US Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
8.4. New Planar Graph Coloring Algorithm for Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment . 77
8.5. US planar graph colored using the algorithm shown in Fig. 8.4. Case (a): No
color set provided by the user. Smallest-last ordering used for this algorithm
is given in Table 8.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
8.6. Color utilization results for the US graph shown in Fig. 8.3 using our new graph
coloring algorithm Fig. 8.4 (cases a and b), and using the smallest-last/SL
coloring algorithm from literature (case c). Smallest-last ordering used for
both the algorithms is given in Table 8.1. Case (a): No color set provided
by the user. Case (b): New algorithm executed using 5 available colors.




4.1. Clock cycles required to access 32-bit TDRa in a serial and a 4-bit parallel
network - Flat architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2. Overall Access Times (no. of clock cycles) - Flat architecture, three instruments.
C=Concurrent, and S=Sequential instrument access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.1. Expected time to unlock an L-PSIB in a hybrid (serial and parallel) network.
s=256, n=64, d=10, shift frequency=10MHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6.1. Broadcast SIB States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
6.2. No. of clock cycles required for read/write of test data using four different
IJTAG network designs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.1. Smallest Last Ordering of the Vertices from the US Planar Graph in Fig. 8.3.
Deletion degree (Del. Deg.) in the table shows the degree of the vertex when
it was deleted from the graph during smallest-last ordering. Order number
shows the order in which vertices get colored—from 0 to 50. DC is included;
total vertices = 51. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Professor Jennifer Dworak, for
her constant support and patient guidance throughout my PhD program. This dissertation
and the associated publications would not have been possible without Dr. Dworak’s extensive
mentoring. Working with Dr. Dworak has been an incredible learning experience and it has
greatly helped in improving my critical thinking and problem-solving abilities.
I would also like to thank the rest of my committee members: Professor Daniel Engels,
Professor Suku Nair, Professor Ping Gui, Professor Eric Larson, and Professor Kundan Nepal
for their constructive suggestions and insightful comments. I would also like to express
my gratitude to Dr. David Matula for the very informative discussions on graph theory
algorithms.
My appreciation also goes to my mentors and colleagues for their help during my in-
ternship at NVIDIA: Vinod Pagalone, Jon Colburn, Milind Sonawane, Jae Wu, Ran Wang,
Bonita Bhaskaran, and Kaushik Narayanun.
I am thankful to my friends for motivating me throughout the course of my research.




Moore’s law [2] predicted that the number of transistors in the Integrated Circuits (ICs or
chips) will double every 18 months. So far this prediction has been largely true because of the
decreasing dimensions, referred to as feature size, of the transistors and interconnecting wires.
The reduction in feature size has resulted from the improvements in the semiconductor design
and manufacturing techniques. This has helped in designing increasingly complex Integrated
Circuits (ICs) that can contain up to a few billion transistors. System-of-Chips (SoCs) are
complex ICs that integrate major functional elements such as microprocessors, digital signal
processors (DSPs), on-chip memory, peripheral interfaces, sensors, communication modules,
etc [3]. While SoCs provide several benefits such as reduction in the overall system cost
and size, increased performance, and lower power consumption they also pose challenges to
the VLSI engineers in each phase of their design, verification, debugging, fabrication, and
testing.
Due to unavoidable process variation or random localized manufacturing imperfections,
it is impossible to fabricate each and every IC without any defects. The increasing number
of transistors on a chip and reducing feature size has also resulted in a higher probability of
manufacturing defects. These manufacturing defects can result in the faulty operation of a
system. Also, nanoscale-devices are more prone to issues such as crosstalk, material aging,
soft errors, and electro-migration. Thus, it is essential to test an IC after it is manufactured
to detect any possible faults in it. These tests are performed at several stages of production,
such as wafer level, package level, and final test before it is sent to the market.
1.1 Embedded Instrumentation
Complex SoCs contain hundreds of circuits embedded into them for a specific control or
data-collection purpose, commonly referred to as instruments. These on-chip instruments
1
can be used for test (Design for Test), debug and diagnosis (Design for Debug/Diagnosis),
validation (Design for Validation), monitoring, characterization, configuration, or functional
purposes. Embedded instrumentation is cost-effective and efficient compared to using stan-
dalone, external instruments like oscilloscopes and logic analyzers to validate designs, verify
the signal integrity on chip-to-chip interconnects and input/output (I/O) buses, test man-
ufactured assemblies, and diagnose failures. Moreover, multi-core and multi-chip devices,
and high volume of semiconductor devices that are integrated on circuit boards has made
using external and modular instrumentation increasingly difficult. Some of these embedded
instruments are listed below:
• Design for Test (DFT): Instruments like digital and analog converters, pattern
matchers and generators, voltage and phase controllers, limit comparators, bit-stream
comparators in I/O blocks of memory chips, integrated programmable pseudo-random
pattern generators, and others are included to provide test coverage within chips and at
the pins. Built in Self Test (BIST) instruments such as Logic BIST (LBIST), Memory
BIST (MBIST), and I/O BIST are used during several test phases of a device.
• Design for Debug/Diagnosis and Validation: Instruments such as logic analyzer,
bus analyzer, and virtual I/O allow to check any internal signal or node, including
embedded hard or soft processors. Embedded instruments can also help to obtain eye
diagram or other instrumentation plots that validate the performance of high-speed
receivers. Other examples include trace buffers, shadow capturing of registers, and
programmable random vector generators.
• Monitoring: Instruments can monitor, sequence, track, and margin multiple system
voltages, adjust voltages according to pre-programmed limits, and store fault data
for future analysis. Process monitors (used to identify systemic problems), voltage
monitors (used to identify IR-drop problems), and temperature monitors, and memory
error detectors are some more examples of such instruments.
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1.2 Motivation of the Thesis
The increasing complexity of SoCs necessitates an increasing number of embedded in-
struments to be included in the chip and the board on which it is placed. The usual method
of accessing and controlling these instruments through the IEEE Std. 1149.1 (Joint Test
Action Group - JTAG) [4] is not scalable anymore [5]. The IEEE Std. 1687 (Internal-
JTAG) [6] is an extension of the IEEE 1149.1 standard. IEEE 1687 focuses on the access
and control of on-chip embedded instruments. IEEE 1687 allows access to these embedded
instruments, connected in a network on the device, in different configurations by dynamically
reconfiguring this network.
The instrument access network used in the IEEE Std. 1687 is a serial scan network. Pre-
vious works have shown ways to optimize the network design and reconfiguration strategies
to reduce the time required to access instruments in the network. Unfortunately, instruments
that require a large amount of test data and several accesses during test mode still result in
long test times when the test data is shifted through the scan path serially. High bandwidth
access to these instruments through parallel network can be useful in reducing the total access
time. It is important to analyze the bandwidth improvements and security aspects of such a
parallel network with respect to the serial scan network used in the IEEE Std. 1687.
To meet high performance requirements, System-on-Chips (SoCs) may include multiple
replicated copies of functional embedded cores. Replicated copies of functional embedded
cores and their associated test/debug embedded instruments require identical test data.
Thus, the same test data needs to be shifted several times through the network for each
instance of the replicated embedded cores. This results in long test data write times in a
standard IJTAG scan network—because the data is shifted through the network serially. To
solve this problem, a configurable and scalable broadcast network architecture using IJTAG
is required.
As some of these embedded instruments can provide very detailed information regarding
the internals of the chip it is important to secure access to these embedded instruments
using IEEE 1687 network. The IEEE 1687 Standard offers new opportunities for securing
scan networks. In [7], Dworak et al. introduced a method to secure access to particular
scan segments–allowing fine-grained protection of different parts of the scan network where
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different instruments could be protected by different keys (or sets of keys).
Previous work shows that brute force attacks on the secure instrument access mechanism
that was introduced in [7] may take thousands of years based on the size of the key and some
other parameters of the network. However, this method of securing access to the instruments
might still be susceptible to side channel attacks such as power analysis attacks. A power
analysis attack takes advantage of the fact that the amount of instantaneous power consumed
by a circuit is typically data dependent and thus extract information regarding the target
circuit by statistically analyzing several power traces of the circuit obtained by applying
different sets of input data. Thus, it is important to study the susceptibility of these proposed
secure designs (of instrument access) to power analysis attacks in an IEEE 1687 network.
As the SoCs become more complex, and larger in sizes the number of scan flip-flops
have also increased along with the increasing number of embedded instruments. This has
also resulted in a dramatic increase in the total test data volume and the number of test
patterns. Thus, the number of test cycles required to shift in the test data has also increased.
To reduce test times, this data is often scanned in and applied to the different SoC blocks
in parallel. However, parallel testing can result in increased simultaneous switching activity
in an SoC beyond its functional specifications. Thus, it is important to explore test design
solutions to reduce the peak test power while shifting test data in parallel to multiple SoC
partitions.
In the next sub-section, the contributions of this thesis regarding security and bandwidth
optimization problems in the area of reconfigurable on-chip embedded instrument access
networks are presented.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
• Parallel-IJTAG Networks [8]: We explored the design of a Parallel-IJTAG network
using network elements that were previously designed for serial IEEE 1687 networks.
We showed that the overhead of dynamically reconfiguring the networks is the same in
both parallel and serial designs. We also calculated the cost of instrument access-times
(number of clock cycles) in both the parallel and serial designs to show access time
reductions in a parallel network.
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• Furthermore, we also improved designs of the network elements that were previously
designed for serial networks – so that they are better suited for a parallel network and
improve instrument access times.
• Secure Instrument Access in Parallel-IJTAG [8]: We explored some of the secu-
rity implications of parallel IJTAG networks. We showed how the security mechanisms
that were introduced for serial networks can also be used in Parallel-IJTAG networks
and investigated the cost and effectiveness of these designs in a Parallel-IJTAG net-
work.
• Despite the increased bandwidth of the instrument access network, the security mecha-
nisms we introduced for serial network are effective in a parallel network. For example,
the expected amount of time for successful random brute force attacks on this secure
instrument access mechanism using keys of sufficient sizes is over 12,000 years.
• Broadcast Network Design Using IJTAG [9]: To reduce the time required to
apply identical test data to these replicated cores, we designed a novel broadcast net-
work architecture that harnesses IEEE Std 1687 (IJTAG). Our architecture provides
highly configurable broadcast/multicast and daisy modes, allowing one to selectively
apply test data to any combination of embedded modules.
The broadcast network is also scalable, supports hierarchical network architectures,
and can be easily interfaced with other IJTAG-compliant test architectures. The new
broadcast network provides a trade-off between network reconfigurability and the pro-
gramming overhead of the network reconfiguration bits. It saves up to 65-80% test
time in our sample test data broadcast scenario when compared to serial and prior
broadcast IJTAG networks. Compared to a serial network, our broadcast network
requires only one extra reconfiguration bit.
• Susceptibility to Power Analysis Attacks [10]: We first investigated the ability
of an attacker to extract the correct key by simply observing the switching activity
that occurs when various bit patterns are shifted through the chain. The purpose of
this mechanism is to offer low cost secure access to the internal embedded instruments,
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thus it is desirable to mitigate power analysis attacks on this mechanism without
significantly adding area overhead.
• Mitigating Power Analysis Attacks [10]: Next, we modified these secure test
network designs and showed that the modified design not only reduces area overhead
by reducing the number of flip-flops required to hold the key bits, but also obfuscates
the switching activity related to a single key.
• Map Coloring to Reduce Test Power: Finally, we studied methods to reduce peak
test power while shifting parallel test data in multiple SoC partitions. One existing
method attempts to solve this problem by staggering a single test clock into differ-
ent shift-clock phases. These staggered shift-clock phases need to be assigned to the
SoC partitions such that no two adjacent partitions receive the same staggered phase
(no conflicts). This assignment problem has been described as Shift-Clock Stagger As-
signment (SCSA) problem in the existing literature. However, previously proposed
solutions do not guarantee a conflict free assignment even with 5 or 6 staggered clock
phases. We designed a new graph coloring algorithm that offers conflict free SCSA
results.
• Our novel planar graph coloring algorithm results in a conflict free assignment of the
staggered clock phases to the SoC partitions. This algorithm also balances the usage
of all the available colors (staggered clock phases) while working within hardware
design constraints. A planar graph coloring algorithm with these set of features wasn’t
available in the literature until now. In some cases, our algorithm also uses fewer colors
than an existing planar graph coloring algorithm from the literature.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present an overview of
the relevant architectural features of the IEEE 1687 test network, previous work in LSIB
based security, and concepts used throughout this thesis.
In Chapter 3, we discuss the past research that has been done for reconfigurable instru-
ment access networks, and throughput optimization. It also presents a broad overview of
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work related to securing scan chains and mitigating power analysis attacks.
Chapter 4 discusses parallel IJTAG architecture and explores design of different Parallel-
SIBs. Chapter 5 extends the analysis to securing a parallel IJTAG network. Chapter 6
presents a configurable and scalable broadcast network design using IJTAG for efficient
parallel testing of replicated embedded cores in SoCs.
Chapter 7 contains an evaluation of several key logic circuits for switching activity cor-
relation, and further enhancements to LSIB based security.
Chapter 8 describes the Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment (SCSA) problem and details
the previously proposed solutions. It also contains relevant background information useful
for the discussion of our new graph coloring algorithm. Finally, the new graph coloring





2.1 IEEE Std. 1149.1
The IEEE 1149.1 Standard [4], commonly known as the JTAG (Joint Test Action Group)
standard, defines test logic that is designed to test the interconnects between chips on a single
printed circuit board. The standard describes the Test Access Port (TAP) controller that
consists of four signals: TMS (test mode select), TDI (test data in), TCK (test clock) and
TDO (test data out), with an optional fifth signal, TRST (test reset). A TAP controller
that dictates the operation protocol of capture-shift-update uses a defined state machine that
allows instrument data to be captured and shifted out serially (a read operation) and new
data to be shifted in serially and updated (a write operation). The input data is supplied
serially through the TDI input pin and synchronized to the rising-edge of TCK, while the
output data is serially shifted out through the TDO output pin and synchronized to the
falling-edge of TCK.
Test data may take one of multiple paths through the JTAG register architecture since
the standard architecture defines multiple register paths such as the instruction register,
boundary scan register, bypass register, ID code register, and generic test data registers
(TDRs). TCK in conjunction with TMS drives the FSM, and it is the FSM that determines
on an initial level whether the scan path taken is either an instruction register (IR) scan or
one of the defined data register (DR) scans – the specific DR taken depends on the encoding
in the IR. In other words, TCK and TMS determine the state of the system.
2.2 IEEE Std. 1687
The IEEE 1687 standard [6] is an extension of the IEEE 1149.1 standard. IEEE 1687
focuses on the access and control of on-chip embedded instruments for device test, debug,
and configuration. Instead of using different instructions in the IEEE 1149.1 Instruction
8
Register (IR) to access embedded instruments in different configurations, IEEE 1687 defines
the use of scan data within the scan chain itself to dynamically reconfigure the chain and open
access to new chain segments. Specifically, special scan cells that act as Network Instruction
Bits (NIBs) are used to generate control signals and reconfigure the scan chain by placing
an appropriate value in the update cell of the NIB during the UpdateDR (Update Data
Register) cycle of the IEEE 1149.1 state machine. A NIB that can reconfigure the scan path
is called a Segment Insertion Bit (SIB).
This distributed control approach allows arbitrary combinations of instruments to be
accessed concurrently without requiring new instructions to be encoded for the instruction
register. As such, it also enables easier design reuse when the combinations of instruments
included in a new version of a design changes because the instruction decoding for the
instruction register does not necessarily need to be redesigned to handle the changes.
2.2.1 Overview of IJTAG
Fig. 2.1 shows an overview of the JTAG architecture and the interfacing of the IEEE 1687
JTAG network to JTAG. Note that additional test data registers (TDRs) that don’t imple-
ment IJTAG may also be present and selected through placing an appropriate instruction in
the instruction register (IR).
An IEEE 1687 test network provides a scalable plug-and-play interface for interfacing
and accessing the on-chip embedded instruments. Moreover, the dynamic reconfiguration
of the IEEE 1687 network through distributed control has significant advantages over a
pure instructional-based approach. Design modifications to the test network, including the
addition of new embedded instruments, is easier because the decoding of the IEEE 1149.1
instruction register does not need to change. It is also possible to access various combinations
of hundreds of instruments without requiring a new instruction for each combination.
2.2.2 Network Instruction Bit (NIB)
The distributed control is obtained using special data-side scan path cells called Network
Instruction Bits (NIBs), shown in Fig. 2.2. Control signals such as “local reset” and “deny”
can be generated by placing correct values in the update cell of a NIB. For example, a local
reset signal could be used to reset an individual instrument’s TDR. In contrast, conducting
9
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Serial IJTAG network 
Figure 2.1: JTAG architecture and interfacing of serial IJTAG network to JTAG
a reset of some portion of the JTAG architecture is generally accomplished by passing the
state machine through the Test-Logic-Reset (TLR) state - which has the bad side effect of
resetting all JTAG chips on a board attached to the same active daisy chain. A “deny”
signal could be used to prevent capture and update operations on a specific TDR to help
with the debugging procedures. Implementing similar functionality using the IEEE 1149.1
JTAG would require a separate instruction for each instrument TDR on the scan path.
2.2.3 Segment Insertion Bit (SIB)
A Segment Insertion Bit (SIB) is a special type of NIB that is used in an IJTAG network
to dynamically reconfigure the active shift path by adding (or removing) a scan segment to
(or from) the active TDI-TDO shift path, as shown in Fig. 2.3. The SIB_Select* signal in
Fig. 2.3 can be asserted or de-asserted by placing an appropriate value in the update cell
of the SIB. When the SIB_Select* signal is asserted, it causes the ScanMux to select the
input connected to the TDO2 signal, which is then fed to the SIB shift cell. Thus the “Extra












Figure 2.2: Network Instruction Bit
is considered to be in “open” state during this mode. The SIB_Select* signal also allows
the Capture, Shift, and Update control signals from TAP controller to propagate to the
“Extra scan segment”. When the SIB_Select* signal is de-asserted, the active shift path
shown consists of only the SIB cell between TDI and TDO. Thus, the “Extra scan segment”
is bypassed. The SIB is considered to be in the “closed” state during this mode.
2.3 Locking Segment Insertion Bit (LSIB)
Unfortunately, while IEEE 1687 has significant advantages for embedded instrument
access, if it is unsecured, it also provides significant opportunities for an attacker to access
those embedded instruments and data as well (and using easily and readily available off-
the-shelf HW and SW). An attacker can easily shift appropriate data into the scan chain to
update each scan cell with a logic 1 or a logic 0, thus changing the length of the scan chain
containing any SIBs and obtaining access to the data and instruments behind them.
For example, by accessing an unsecured IEEE 1687 network, attackers may obtain in-
formation related to encryption keys, IC identifiers, sensor data, trace buffers and hardware
monitors. Attackers may be able to access memories through an MBIST (Memory BIST)




































































Figure 2.3: SIB design
access to embedded instruments in an IEEE 1687 network is critical to the integrity of the
IC’s data and functionality.
In [7], Dworak et al. introduce Locking Segment Insertion Bits (LSIBs) to secure access
to segments in IEEE 1687. To open an LSIB, a preselected key must be present in the scan
chain. This key is then used to enable the update signal for the LSIB. Thus LSIBs provide
fine grained protection and secure access to different instruments using different keys or set
of keys. The circuitry that checks the values placed in the key bits on the scan chain against
the correct value of the LSIB’s key is referred to in this paper as the "key logic". Further
12
optimizations to LSIB based security in an IEEE 1687 network were discussed in [11–13].






































































Figure 2.4: Locking SIB that prevents Update from Assert/Deassert of SIB_Select
An LSIB is a SIB that has been modified to prevent the SIB from “opening” or “closing”
unless the conditions needed to “Unlock” the LSIB have been met. In this figure, an AND
gate has been added so that an update operation (Update Data Register cycle of the TAP
13
controller) on the update cell can only be performed if the Unlock signal is set to a 1. In
general, the value of the Unlock signal is determined by the values of other signals, such as
the values placed in other scan cells in the IJTAG network.
Fig. 2.5. shows a 10-bit scan path segment with an LSIB (shown in orange) and six key
bits (shown in blue) on the chain. The shift and update cells of each scan cell are shown
separately. All the key bits are in the update cells of the scan cells.
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Figure 2.5: Example scan network with 1 LSIB and 6 key bits.
The additional scan path between TDI2 and TDO2 can be inserted at any point in the
normally accessible scan path since it is represented by a ScanMux which is not required to
be co-located with its control (update) bit. In the example circuit in Fig. 2.5. the additional
scan path is inserted between shift bit-2 and bit-3 next to the LSIB. The AND gates in the
Fig. 2.5. constitute the key logic circuit. If the correct key value is placed in all the key bit
locations shown in Fig. 2.5. then the key logic circuit generates the Unlock signal shown in
14
Fig. 2.4. The last AND gate, feeding into the update cell (orange color) of the LSIB, is the
same as the AND gate in Fig. 2.4.
Thus, from the description of the logic shown in Fig. 2.4. and Fig. 2.5. we can see that
to allow access to the additional scan path between the TDI2 and TDO2, two conditions are
required to be met. First is to generate the Unlock signal, that allows the UpdateEn signal
to the update cell of the LSIB, by placing the correct key value in the key-bit locations of
the scan chain, so that the update cell can receive data from the shift cell. This key value is
referred to in this paper as the “LSIB unlock key”, or simply “LSIB key”.
The second condition is to place appropriate value in the update cell, so that the update
cell generates the Select* signal when the UpdateEn is asserted, consequently enabling access
to the additional scan path. This appropriate value that should be placed in an LSIB’s update
cell is referred to in this paper as the “LSIB update cell value”. The SIB (and consequently,
the LSIB) should be made such that the timing separates these two conditions to becoming
two separate DR operations – a SIB does not react to its own update such that it does a
spurious Write upon opening or closing – some hardware designs delay the actual generation
of the Select* signal by 1
2
a TCK cycle.
So, these two operations, which open (or close) an LSIB, would need two Data-Register-
Scans (DR-Scans), which means two passes through the data-side of the JTAG State-
Machine. The first condition sets the keys, the second condition enables the LSIB to open or
close, but the actual access and operation of the added scan path isn’t until the third pass
through the DR-side of the FSM – a hacker will not receive feedback of success or failure
until the third DR-Scan.
The time required for an attacker to unlock an LSIB increases based on the scan chain
length and number of key bits. Depending on the length of the chain, the size of the key, and
the scan shift frequency, it may take hundreds or thousands of years on average to successfully
open an LSIB with a brute force attack that attempts to simply guess the correct key by
shifting bits through the network.
Other variations of this approach are also possible. For example, one may also place the
key bits in the Shift cells of other scan cells of the chain. This decreases the amount of time
required for an authorized user to access the instrument. However, it potentially provides
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less security because it is easier for an attacker who does not know the key to make opening
attempts with new key guesses more quickly. It may also make power analysis attacks easier.
However, to some extent, this reduction in security can be counteracted by adding additional
key bits. For example, it was shown in [7], that the expected amount of time for a successful
brute force attack on a 48-bit long LSIB key in a scan chain approximately 5000 bits long and
operating at a scan shift frequency of 10 MHz is on the order of thousands of years. Thus,
LSIBs provide a scalable method of securing access to the internal embedded instruments





3.1 IEEE Std. 1687
Previous works have discussed methods to calculate the time required for instrument
access and methods to reduce overall instrument access times in an IEEE 1687 network.
Algorithms for automated design and optimization of 1687 networks were discussed in [14].
In [15], a method to calculate the overall access time (OAT) for a given IEEE 1687 net-
work was presented. OAT calculations were performed on flat and hierarchical network
architectures using two access schedules—a sequential schedule and a concurrent schedule.
A methodology to evaluate the test cost of reconfigurable networks, according to the func-
tional fault model introduced in [16], was presented in [17]. The problem of test scheduling to
reduce test access-times while satisfying resource and power constraints was also discussed
in [18], and hybrid test schedules (a combination of sequential and concurrent schedules)
were explored. The hybrid test-scheduling method to reduce OAT while satisfying resource
and power constraints that was proposed in [18] was further optimized in [19]. In [20], an
efficient scalable-methodology for the delivery and localization of interrupts was presented
based on hierarchical, multi-mode IJTAG networks.
The authors of [21] investigated the potential use of parallel test access in the context of
3D stacked ICs. As part of this work they discussed increasing the number of scan paths in
an IJTAG network that used the “Remote Controlled Scan Mux Architecture” (RCSMA) for
scan path reconfiguration. While RCSMA has advantages, it also requires a pass through
the IR (Instruction Register) scan to reset the value of the Scan Control Unit each time
before the scan chain can be reconfigured.
As the number of instruments that must be accessed concurrently in an IEEE 1687
network increases, the amount of data that must be shifted through the chain on every
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Capture-Shift-Update cycle of the JTAG state machine increases as well. This can dramati-
cally increase test time in a traditional IEEE 1687 scan network—especially if the instruments
have long TDRs—because the data is shifted through the network serially from the test data
in (TDI) port to the test data out (TDO) port.
To help address this issue, this thesis explores a Parallel IJTAG architecture that is
reconfigured thorugh the use of Parallel-SIBs (P-SIBs).
3.2 Broadcasting Test Data
In VLSI testing, the concept of broadcasting test data has been traditionally associated
with applying the same test data to multiple internal scan chains. This was first proposed
in [22] and [23]. Other scan architectures, such as Illinois scan have also used broadcast scan
modes [24,25]. Several compression based test architectures, such as [26], [27], and [28] have
used broadcast scans schemes. The conceptual modular architecture using a Test Access
Mechanism (TAM) and a core test wrapper was published in [29]. A TAM and wrapper
architecture for parallel testing of identical cores was discussed in [30]. Parallel testing of
multiple identical cores using a broadcast-based TAM has also been discussed in [31–33].
Along with improving the TAM bandwidth, several other solutions to reduce test times and
leverage wasted shift cycles for test time/quality improvements have been proposed [34–37].
The IEEE 1500 Standard [38] for embedded core-based integrated circuits defines a wrap-
per parallel port (WPP) as a parallel interface to the IEEE 1500 wrapper. This parallel access
mechanism provides increased data bandwidth to the wrapper core. However, the IEEE Std
1149.1 [39] for board testing and the IEEE Std 1500 [38] do not provide broadcast scan mech-
anisms to apply identical test data to the replicated copies of embedded cores in an SoC.
In contrast, broadcast network designs to apply identical data to multiple test instruments
were briefly discussed in the IEEE Std 1687 [1, pp. 230-232]. In addition, a Parallel-IJTAG
network architecture and some optimizations were discussed in [8], but a data broadcast
mode was not included in that discussion.
3.3 Previous Broadcast Network Designs
An example broadcast network design from the IJTAG standard documentation is shown
in Fig. 3.1. The network design shown in Fig. 3.1 supports both broadcast and daisy chain
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modes. Here, the network can be operated in broadcast mode by asserting the broadcast
control signal of the Network Instruction Bit (NIB). During the broadcast mode, all three
instruments can be loaded simultaneously. However, there is no way to configure the broad-
cast mode such that some instruments remain bypassed during broadcast and only a subset
of these instruments receive the broadcasted data. Also, there is no way to reconfigure the






































































































Figure 3.1: Broadcast and daisy scan example from the IEEE Std 1687, [1, p. 232]
Another example broadcast network design from the IJTAG standard is shown in Fig. 3.2.
This design can be used to broadcast test data to all three instruments in the network. It
can also access and control exactly one instrument at a time by asserting Sel1, Sel2, or
Sel3. However, it does not provide a daisy mode so that all the instruments can be read
out concurrently in series. Similar to the design in Fig. 3.1, with this design there is no way
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to configure the broadcast mode such that some instruments are bypassed during broadcast
and only a subset of these instruments receive the broadcast data.
Test Data Reg C 
Partition_C 
Test Data Reg A 
Partition_A 












































Figure 3.2: Broadcast design example with exclusive access from the IEEE Std 1687, [1,
p. 231]
In contrast, our new broadcast network architecture provides configurable broadcast and
daisy modes, and improves test data write times with very low additional area overhead.
3.4 Test Security
Historically, attackers trying to gain access to internal data and functionality of the
chips and the board have used the JTAG port. For example, hackers have previously used
the JTAG port to disable the Digital Rights Management (DRM) policy on an Xbox [40].
Unfortunately, more malicious attacks may also occur in which an attacker attempts to gain
access to private data, debug instruments, test circuitry, state information, or configuration
hardware by serially scanning in private or undocumented instructions or data into the
20
instruction register and scan chains.
As a result of successful scan chain-based attacks, methods of securing the scan chain and
the JTAG ports have been developed. One particular method involves limiting scan chain
access by using challenge response pairs [41–43]. As an example, in [42], Clark introduced a
JTAG design that uses the SHA256 hash algorithm and a true random number generator to
create challenge response pairs that limit access to chip internals via the scan chain. In [44],
a security module and test control module are used to protect memory content. When
the security module is in restricted mode, data encryption and decryption of the memory
contents is disabled, the TDO pin is forced to a logic 1, and only limited access to the
memory is permitted.
Scan chain attacks have also been successful in compromising cryptographic algorithm
implementations. Yang et al. [45] show how scan chains can be used to mount side channel
attacks on a hardware implementation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). A scan chain-
based side channel attack on a stream cipher was successfully shown by Mukhopadhyay et
al. [46]. Similarly, Kamal and Youssef [47] describe the use of scan chain-based side channel
attacks to retrieve the secret keys of the NTRUEncrypt cryptosystem. Additional scan
chain-based attacks have been shown to extract the secret keys from ciphers [48].
To avoid scan chain-based attacks, it has been suggested that the scan chain be divided
into segments whose access order may be reconfigured [49–51]. Reconfiguration may occur
automatically when, for example, the first k bits that are shifted into the scan chain do not
correspond to the first k bits of the key.
Additional security mechanisms have been proposed to further secure an IEEE 1687 scan
chain network against attacks. LSIB based security proposed in [7] is discussed in Section 2.3.
Liu and Agrawal [52] introduced a key generation mechanism that uses a linear feedback shift
register (LFSR) to dynamically generate keys. A defined number of scan flip flops are used
to create an LFSR that is used for key generation. In [53], Baranowski et al. propose a
challenge-response protocol that uses secure segment insertion bits to reconfigure the length
of the scan chain. All of these secret key methods make it harder for an attacker to use brute
force attacks to gain access to hidden or secure segments of IEEE 1687 networks.
21
3.4.1 Power Analysis Attacks
To some extent, breaking key-based protection mechanisms in scan-based circuits is in-
herently different from breaking cryptographic keys. Unlike cryptographic analysis, breaking
into a scan chain generally requires explicitly shifting data through the chain and performing
capture and update operations until the desired behavior is seen. Thus, brute force attacks
can be very difficult and time consuming.
However, these protection mechanisms may still be susceptible to side channel attacks,
such as power analysis attacks. Kocher et al., [54] presented practical methods of performing
power analysis on cryptographic circuits. One of the methods proposed to extract the secret
keys using power analysis is called Simple Power Analysis (SPA). SPA can be used when a
visual inspection of the circuit’s power trace can leak information regarding the secret key
or the intermediate values propagating through the circuit.
In [55], two categories of countermeasures against power analysis were discussed: hiding
and masking. Hiding involves design changes which makes power consumption random or
uniform for all the input data values, and masking involves randomizing the intermediate
values.
Several papers have proposed different methods of hiding and masking countermea-
sures [56, 57]. To evaluate the robustness of these countermeasures in a circuit several sim-
ulation methods at different design stages from system level to post layout level have been
proposed. High level of abstraction models were used to simulate leakage traces in [58], [59]
proposes convolution-based framework to predict power consumption at each supply pad in
the IC using post-layout design instead of performing the time consuming full-chip SPICE
simulations, and [60] evaluates speed and accuracy of analog (SPICE) and digital (toggle
count from VCD file) simulations for leakage analysis on post-layout netlists. Statistical
model for subthreshold current while considering process variations have also been pro-
posed [61].
Although previous work has investigated the ability of LSIB-based security approaches
to withstand brute force attacks, the ability of an attacker to deduce a key from scanning




A PARALLEL IJTAG NETWORK
As discussed in Section 3.1 several methods of reducing SIB overhead and different in-
strument test scheduling algorithms have previously been proposed. However, even if the
SIB overhead is reduced, the IJTAG networks discussed until now are limited due to their
serial scan designs. Thus, the test time (number of clock cycles) depends on the size of the
instrument’s TDR and the number of times an instrument is accessed. In this paper, to in-
crease the bandwidth of the IJTAG network, we discuss two ways of designing a Parallel-SIB
based distributed control network.
Fig. 4.1 shows a conceptual overview of the JTAG circuitry and the interfacing of a
Parallel-IJTAG network to JTAG. The required Capture, Shift, and Update control signals to
the instruction register and to the test data registers, including the Parallel-IJTAG network,
are supplied from the TAP controller. The n-bit wide Parallel-IJTAG network is fed by TDI
from the TAP and an (n−1)-bit wide Parallel-TDI (P-TDI) bus. The (n−1)-bit P-TDI and
(n− 1)-bit P-TDO bus can be multiplexed with general purpose input/output (GPIO) pins
on the chip such that during test mode the GPIO pins can be used for P-TDI and P-TDO. If
enough GPIO pins cannot be multiplexed during the test mode then an alternative may be
to supply the parallel data through SerDes input/output ports, if such ports are provided.
4.0.1 SIBs in Parallel-IJTAG network - I
The n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network is similar to a serial IJTAG network with multiple
scan paths. In the simplest case, a k -bit TDR is divided into n registers (TDR segments)
each of size (k/n) bits. Each SIB in the serial IJTAG network is also replaced with n SIBs
distributed over the parallel scan paths. If the length (k) of the TDR and the width (n)
of the parallel network is such that (k/n) is not an integer then the n-th TDR segment is
padded with additional shift cells such that its length is equal to the other remaining (n−1)
23
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Figure 4.1: JTAG architecture and interfacing a Parallel-IJTAG network to JTAG.
TDR segments.
An n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network is shown in Fig. 4.2, and the corresponding serial IJTAG
network with three SIBs is shown in Fig. 4.3. For the sake of simplicity, instead of showing
TDI from the TAP and the additional (n − 1) P-TDIs for the parallel network separately,
we labelled the entire n-bit input port as P-TDI. (This convention is followed in the rest of
this paper.) These example network designs are based on the flat architecture. In this flat
architecture, each SIB is in the active scan path regardless of its open or closed state. Thus,
each additional SIB in this flat network contributes to the SIB programming overhead every
time an instrument needs to be accessed through the network.
If a 4-bit Parallel-IJTAG network is designed based on the flat architecture shown in
Fig. 4.2, then a 32-bit TDRa from the serial IJTAG network is divided into a set of four
segments – TDR1, TDR2, TDR3, and TDR4. These four TDR segments are in separate scan
paths connected to four different SIBs – SIB1, SIB2, SIB3, and SIB4. Thus the SIBa from

































































Figure 4.2: Simple Parallel SIBs - Flat architecture
other SIBs (SIBb and SIBc in this instance) and their respective TDRs (TDRb and TDRc)
from the serial network can be implemented in this Parallel-IJTAG network.
Opening (or closing) SIBs requires scanning in their control bits through the scan path,
which contributes to the SIB programming over head. Also, the JTAG state machine needs
to be cycled in the sequence of Exit1-DR, Update-DR, Select-DR, Capture-DR, and Shift-DR
states to perform update and capture operations on the TDRs between two shift operations.
Thus, the instrument access-time in an IJTAG network depends on the SIB programming
overhead, the TAP controller cycles, the instrument TDR length (L), and the number of
times (A) the instrument needs to accessed during test.
To calculate the test time improvements in the Parallel-IJTAG network compared to the
serial design, we calculate the SIB programming overhead and the number of clock cycles
required to perform read/write operations on the instrument TDRs in the example flat
network designs shown in Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.2. We assume the length of TDRa=32-bits, and
the Parallel-IJTAG network is assumed to have four parallel scan paths. We also assume
that the instruments are accessed sequentially as opposed to concurrently in the order that
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Figure 4.3: Serial SIBs - Flat architecture
the SIBs associated to these instruments appear in the scan path. Thus, SIBa in the serial
design and in the parallel design (SIB1, SIB2, SIB3, and SIB4) is opened in the first scan
operation by shifting in three bits in each scan path. Five more clock cycles are needed to
apply UpdateDR and return to the ShiftDR through the JTAG state machine so that a new
scan shift cycle can commence. (This is shown in Row 1 in Table 4.1). Once SIBa is opened,
the active serial scan path will include the 32 bits of TDRa, and the four active scan paths
of the parallel network will include the 8 bits of TDR1, TDR2, TDR3, and TDR4. Thus, the
next scan operation in the serial network will shift in three bits for the SIBs and 32 bits for
the TDRa. On the other hand, the parallel network will shift in three bits for the SIBs and 8
bits for the TDRs in each of the four scan paths. During each of these scan operations, the
previous output vector from the instrument can be scanned out while scanning in a new input
vector. Hence to access an instrument 5 times this scan operation will be performed 5 times
in total (Rows 2 and 3). Finally, an additional scan operation would be required to scan
out the final output vector and close SIBa (Row 4). The number of clock cycles required to
perform these operations in both the serial and Parallel-IJTAG networks is shown in Row 5.
Accessing the other instruments sequentially would require this process to be repeated again
for each instrument. Concurrent access would involve fewer iterations of this procedure, but
the shift cycles would be longer to accommodate multiple TDRs being present on the chain
simultaneously.
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Table 4.1: Clock cycles required to access 32-bit TDRa in a serial and a 4-bit parallel network
- Flat architecture
Operation Serial IJTAG 
# clock cycles 
4-bit Parallel IJTAG 
# clock cycles 
Open SIBa 3(SIBs) + 5(TAP) 3(SIBs) + 5(TAP) 
Scan out previous output 
vector + Scan in new input 
vector (TDRa) 
(3 + 32) + 5 (3 + 8) + 5 
Repeat previous operation 
4 more times 
[(3 + 32) + 5]*4 [(3 + 8) + 5]*4 
Scan out final output vector (3 + 32) + 5 (3 + 8) + 5 
 ∑=248 ∑=104 
 
As shown in Table 4.1, the SIB programming overhead for the Parallel-IJTAG and serial
network remains the same. However, the instrument access-times (number of clock cycles)
decreases in the Parallel-IJTAG network depending on the number of parallel scan paths
available. Table 4.2 shows the Overall Access Times (OAT) for three instruments in both
parallel and serial networks based on flat architecture using both concurrent (C) and se-
quential (S) test schedules. The calculation for the OAT values is based on the discussion
in [15]. We can see that the OAT for instruments in a parallel network reduces drastically
as compared to the serial network, for both concurrent and sequential schedules. The total
number of single bit SIBs required in an n-bit simple Parallel-IJTAG network increases by
a factor of n.
4.0.2 Parallel-SIBs (P-SIBs) in Parallel-IJTAG network - II
In the previous subsection the n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network design was obtained by
simply adding n serial scan paths in parallel to the IJTAG network. The SIB programming
overhead and the number of clock cycles required to shift SIB data remained the same as
compared to the corresponding serial IJTAG network design. However, the area overhead
contributed by the SIBs increased by a factor of n. The n-bit Parallel-SIB shown in Fig. 4.4
reduces this SIB area overhead by using only one update cell and n shift cells.
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Figure 4.4: n-bit Parallel-SIB using single update cell for an n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network
28
Table 4.2: Overall Access Times (no. of clock cycles) - Flat architecture, three instruments.
C=Concurrent, and S=Sequential instrument access
TDR length 
La, Lb, Lc 
TDR 
Access 




n=4 n=8 n=16 n=1 n=1 
C S C S C S C S 
32, 48, 64 5, 4, 6 284 372 174 262 119 207 944 1032 
128, 64, 256 4, 3, 2 464 520 256 312 152 208 1712 1768 
32, 16, 64 6, 4, 8 300 396 190 286 135 231 960 1056 
128, 256, 512 2, 2, 1 576 616 304 344 168 208 2208 2248 
 
then an UpdateEn signal is applied. The update-1 cell generates the Select* signal which is
applied to the muxes of the n shift cells in the parallel scan paths. The TDRs connected to
these shift cells are also enabled and now become part of the active parallel scan paths.
The SIB programming overhead of the parallel network designed using this Parallel-
SIB design is the same compared to the previous parallel design or existing serial IJTAG
network designs. Thus, the bandwidth improvements are the same as in the previous design.
However, this design requires (n − 1) fewer update cells for each Parallel-SIB compared to
the previous parallel network.
4.0.3 Parallel-IJTAG network using Addressable Parallel-SIBs
In the P-SIB design discussed in the previous sub-section, the bit from the shift-1 cell is
fed to the update-1 cell directly to generate the Select* for all of the parallel SIBs. Another
way to design this P-SIB is such that the bits from some or all of the shift cells are AND’ed
together in complemented or uncomplemented form before feeding the result to the update-
1 cell. In this way, the Select* signal will be generated only if all of the shift cells in the
Parallel-SIB contain the correct values during update operation. Thus, the parallel SIB is
now addressable. The P-SIB shown in Fig. 4.5 is an addressable PSIB which opens when the
bits 10...1 are shifted into the shift cells of the PSIB followed by an update operation.
One of the uses of addressable PSIBs can be in designing broadcast networks such as that



















































Figure 4.5: n-bit Addressable Parallel-SIB. Address=(10...1)n
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paths, the PSIB with the correct address opens and allows access to the instrument’s TDR.
This network design can be useful in cases when the number of pins available for PTDI
are limited and no two instruments need to be accessed concurrently. It also reduces the
SIB programming overhead during each instrument access because the instruments are not

































Figure 4.6: Broadcast network using Addressable-PSIBs to reduce the length of the scan
paths
4.1 Hybrid IJTAG Network
The test architecture shown in Fig. 4.1 includes only the Parallel-IJTAG network. Even
though the parallel design provides high bandwidth access to the embedded instruments,
it requires more SIBs compared the serial network and adds to the complexity of routing
control signals to the additional SIBs.
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Fig. 4.7 shows a conceptual overview of the JTAG circuitry and the interfacing of a
serial and Parallel-IJTAG network to JTAG. This architecture can provide the designer with
opportunities to make tradeoffs between the instrument access times and the area of the
test network. Instruments that require high bandwidth or the instruments that need to
be accessed several times during test can be included in the parallel network. Similarly,
instruments with smaller TDRs or instruments that do not require frequent access during
test can be placed in the serial network. Additional parallel and/or serial TDRs could also
be included if desired.
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5.1 Securing Parallel-IJTAG network
Securing access to the embedded instruments in a serial IJTAG network using Locking-
SIBs was shown to be effective against brute force attacks in [7]. In the following subsections
we explore designs which use LSIBs to secure instrument access in a Parallel-IJTAG network.
5.1.1 LSIBs in Parallel-IJTAG network - I
As shown in Fig. 2.5, in a serial IJTAG network the key bits required to unlock the
LSIB are present in the serial scan path. These key bits are present in the update cells (or
shift cells) of other SIBs in the scan path or in the update cells (or shift cells) of scan cells
specially inserted in the scan path to hold key bits. The output from these key bit holding
cells is fed to a tree of AND and NOT gates (referred to as Key Logic in this paper) which
generates the LSIB Unlock signal. In an n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network these j key bits are
spread over j scan cells in n parallel scan paths. Fig. 5.1 shows an n-bit Parallel-IJTAG
network with Locking-SIBs.
The n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network shown in Fig. 5.1 is similar to the one in Fig. 4.2, but
SIBa in the network is replaced with LSIBa. This LSIBa consists of n single-bit LSIBs (LSIB1,
LSIB2, LSIB3, to LSIBn), with one LSIB in each of the n parallel scan paths providing secure
access to its own subcomponent of TDRa. The unlock signal for the LSIBs in the parallel
scan path is generated by the key logic circuit when the correct key bit values are placed
in the update cells of the key-bit holding registers. (In this case, n update cells from SIBb
and SIBc) are used as key bits. In an actual implementation the key bits can be located





































































Figure 5.1: Locking-SIBs in a Parallel-IJTAG network
5.1.2 Locking-Parallel-SIBs (L-PSIBs) in Parallel-IJTAG network - II
In the previous subsection, an n-bit LSIB with a j -bit key in a Parallel-IJTAG network
was described by replacing the single-bit SIBs in the parallel scan paths by single-bit LSIBs.
As in the case of the Parallel-SIBs described in Section 4.0.2, we can design an n-bit Locking-
PSIB that consists of only one update cell and n shift cells. Fig. 5.2 shows an n-bit Locking-
PSIB that can be used in an n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network.
In a Parallel-IJTAG network designed using this Locking-PSIB and the Parallel-SIBs
from Section 4.0.2, the key bits are scanned in the shift registers of the scan cells. The key
bits scanned in these shift registers are fed to the key logic circuit that generates an unlock
signal. This unlock signal gates the UpdateEn signal to the single update cell present in
the Locking-PSIB. If an appropriate value has been shifted into the shift-1 register of the
Locking-PSIB at the same time that the key logic has asserted Unlock, the update1 register

















































Figure 5.2: Locking-SIB using single update cell in an n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network
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fed to the muxes of all the parallel components of the Locking-PSIB and adds the (k/n)-bit
TDR segments to their respective parallel scan paths.
5.1.3 Cost of a Guess
The previous two subsections showed ways to provide secure access to the embedded
instruments in a Parallel-IJTAG network. We now discuss the cost of guessing a j -bit key
in an n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network of length m-bits. Compared to the serial network in
which each key bit is scanned in sequentially, in an n-bit Parallel-IJTAG network (j/n) key
bits can be scanned in one shift operation. Due to this, it might appear that the LSIB
security in a parallel network may be easily defeated using brute force attacks that attempt
to access the network by trying random keys. However, a Parallel-IJTAG network using
the standard JTAG controller still needs to go through the JTAG FSM’s states for each key
guess. In this subsection, we show how this affects the cost of applying guess keys through
the Parallel-IJTAG network.
The key logic circuits in both the Parallel-IJTAG network and the serial network work
the same way. The outputs from the key bit holding registers are applied to the key logic
circuit in parallel, and if the correct key is applied then the key logic generates an unlock
signal for the LSIBs (or L-PSIBS). Thus, the amount of time required to make a simple key
guess during a random brute force attack in both networks depends simply on the length of
the chain and the number of clock cycles required to traverse the JTAG state machine.
As discussed earlier, the SIB programming overhead for the Parallel-IJTAG network is
same as in the serial network. Thus, the length of the two networks designed with same
SIB hierarchy when all the SIBs are closed will be equal. In a serial network, when a SIB is
opened to access a k -bit TDR, the length of the active scan path increases by k -bits. In the
Parallel-IJTAG network, when an n-bit SIB is opened to access a k -bit TDR, the lengths of
all the active parallel scan paths increase by (n/k)-bits. Thus the length of an n-bit parallel
network when all of the SIBs are open would depend on the length k of the TDRs and the
number of n parallel scan paths.
To investigate the time required to access an instrument hidden behind an L-PSIB, we
first assume that the length of the parallel scan paths is (m-bits) long, which is ideally longer
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than the (j/n)-bits on the scan path that correspond to the key and the LSIB bit that the
attacker is trying to open. We also assume that the Locking-PSIB discussed in Section 5.1.2
is used in the network and that the key bits are present in the shift cells (as opposed to
update cells). The TAP controller state transitions that are required in an attempt to open









Exit 1 DR 
1 cycle - attempt to 
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1 cycle – Previously 
scanned in guess key 
is destroyed 
1 cycle 
(m+d) cycles – Shift in 
deterministic pattern of 
length d followed by m 
guess bits 
Figure 5.3: TAP controller states to open an LSIB with a guess key pattern in the network.
An UpdateDR should be performed after the guess key pattern is scanned in the network.
If the guess key is correct then the key logic circuit would generate an L-PSIB unlock signal
and the UpdateDR operation will open the L-PSIB if the correct value was simultaneously
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placed in the shift-1 cell of the L-PSIB. This will add (n/k)-bits of the TDR segments to the
parallel scan paths. This UpdateDR operation is followed by cycles required to check if length
of the chain has changed indicating that the L-PSIB is now open. Checking the length of
the chain involves shifting a deterministic pattern of length d through the chain of expected
length m. Because the transition from UpdateDR to ShiftDR includes an intermediate
CaptureDR state, any previously scanned in guess pattern may now be overwritten if the
corresponding shift cells of the key bits are also designed to capture data. The deterministic
pattern of length d is now shifted in, followed by the next guess key pattern, which is shifted
through the length m of the parallel scan paths. Thus, the attacker would need to shift for
(m+ d) cycles for each guess key. The cost of applying a guess key, attempting to open the
L-PSIB, and checking if the chain length is changed is thus:
Costguess = (5 +m+ d) cycles
For an L-PSIB key of length j -bits the expected number of guess key patterns required
is 2j+1. The “plus 1” is for the correct value that must be clocked into the LSIB’s update
cell. This equation also assumes that the chain is sufficiently longer than the key that
even seemingly different random key guesses by an attacker who does not know the key bit
locations may be identical in the key bits themselves. Even relatively small key sizes can lead
to long brute force attack times. For example, the expected amount of time for a successful
brute force attack on average for a key size of 56 bits in 256 bit long parallel scan chains
with a shift clock frequency of 10MHz is over 60000 years.
5.1.4 Securing instrument access in a hybrid IJTAG architecture
As discussed in the previous section, the amount of time required to open an L-PSIB
using guess keys depends on the size of the key and the length of the parallel scan paths.
The length of the parallel network and its corresponding serial network is the same if all the
SIBs are closed. However, as mentioned earlier, the length of the parallel network does not
increase by the same amount as that of the serial network when a SIB is opened to allow
access to an instrument’s TDR. Thus at any given time in a parallel network, if some of the
SIBs are open, then the length of the parallel scan paths will be smaller than the length of
the corresponding serial network designed with the same SIB hierarchy. As the number of
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parallel scan paths in the Parallel-IJTAG network increases, and as the number of L-PSIBs
that are open increases, this difference in lengths between the two networks will increase as
well.
The hybrid serial and parallel network discussed in Section 4.1 provides further oppor-
tunities to mitigate the brute force attacks on L-PSIBs in a parallel network as the number
of parallel scan paths increases. Because the hybrid architecture consists of both the serial
and parallel networks, the key logic circuits of L-PSIBs from the parallel network can be
moved to the serial network. Thus, these key logic circuits can be fed with key bits from the
the serial scan path. Moreover, these key logic circuits for the L-PSIBs that are moved to
the serial network can share the same input registers as the other existing key logic circuits
designed for LSIBs in the serial network.
In this design, an L-PSIB would be unlocked by first selecting the TDR containing the
serial network with the JTAG state machine. If we assume that the attacker is starting in
the SelectDR state of the JTAG state machine, Fig. 5.4 shows the subsequent steps that
would be followed by an attacker trying to open an L-PSIB in a hybrid network.
First, if the serial chain length is s, then leaving SelectDR, shifting a key guess into the
serial network, applying UpdateDR, and returning to SelectDR requires s + 5 clock cycles.
Next, the attacker must shift to the parallel network. This requires changing the instruction
in the JTAG instruction register. Entering the IR-Scan half of the state machine takes one
clock cycle. If the length of the instruction register is i, then leaving SelectIR, shifting in the
instruction, applying UpdateIR, and returning to SelectDR requires i + 5 cycles. Next, the
attacker tries to get the correct value in the Update cells of any L-PSIBs in the hope that the
key was set correctly and an L-PSIB will open. A new DR-scan begins and all 1’s are shifted
into the parallel network. If the parallel network is of length m, this requires m + 5 cycles.
This is followed by a second DR-scan that attempts to check the length of the chain to see
if an L-PSIB was opened successfully. This consists of shifting in a distinctive pattern of d
bits followed by an m-bit pattern of all 0’s and applying UpdateDR. This requires m+ d+5
cycles. Next, assuming the attacker was unsuccessful at opening an L-PSIB with the all
1’s attempt, he can use the 0’s already in the chain to attempt to get the correct value in
the L-PSIB’s update cell and once again check the length of the chain. This requires an
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 Data Register(DR) scan – shift 
guess pattern in the s-bits long 
serial network 
Instruction Register (IR) scan - 
switch to the parallel network 
Data Register(DR) scan - shift all 1s 
to open an L-PSIB in the m-bits long 
parallel network 
DR scan - shift a d-bit deterministic 
pattern (check length), and shift all 
0s to open an L-PSIB in the m-bits 
long parallel network 
DR scan - shift a d-bit deterministic 
pattern (check length) in the m-bits 
long parallel network 
If unsuccessful – Run Instruction 
Register (IR) scan - switch to the 







1 cycle DR to IR 
1 cycle DR to IR 
Figure 5.4: Steps (clock cycles) required in an attempt to open an L-PSIB in a parallel
network with its key logic in the serial network, using a guess pattern during a random brute
force attack.
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additional m + d + 5 clock cycles. If the attacker is still unsuccessful, he will need to once
again switch to the serial network to begin a new guess. This requires 1+ i+5 clock cycles.
The process can now begin again with a new key guess. Thus, the total cost of a guess is:
Costguess = (32 + s+ 3 ∗m+ 2 ∗ d+ 2 ∗ i) cycles
Because the attacker is now able to deterministically try both a logic 1 and a logic 0
in the L-PSIB’s update cells (as shown in boxes 5 and 6 of Fig. 5.4), the expected number
of random guesses on average is 2k (assuming that the key size is much smaller than the
serial scan path length and thus an attacker without detailed knowledge of the key locations
cannot deterministically avoid repeatedly using the same key values in his guesses).
As shown in Table 5.1, this approach provides more security than the previous version
due to the extra passes through IR-Scan and the greater likelihood of being able to hide the
locations of the key bits. In this case, when s = 256, n = 64, and d = 10, and the clock
frequency is 10 MHz, the expected time to open an L-PSIB with a 56-bit key is approximately
118,000 years on average.
Table 5.1: Expected time to unlock an L-PSIB in a hybrid (serial and parallel) network.
s=256, n=64, d=10, shift frequency=10MHz
L-PSIB  
Key – j-bits 
48 56 64 72 80 




EFFICIENT PARALLEL TESTING: A CONFIGURABLE AND SCALABLE
BROADCAST NETWORK DESIGN USING IJTAG
As discussed in Section 3.3, the IEEE Std 1687 describes two example broadcast networks.
However, those networks broadcast the test data to all the instruments in the network. Thus,
a careful decision has to be made during design regarding which instruments should be
collected together in a broadcast group. A reconfigurable broadcast mode would give more
flexibility during the design phase as well as during the actual testing phase. A network that
provides reconfigurable broadcast (and daisy) modes and supports hierarchical broadcast
networks and that has a low increase in the area overhead compared to a serial IJTAG
network is desirable. The new broadcast network was designed keeping these design features
in mind; using IJTAG also makes the architecture scalable. The new IJTAG broadcast
network can be interfaced to the JTAG circuitry similar to the interfacing of IJTAG network
shown in Fig. 2.1.
Some of the major features of this architecture are the following:
• Reconfigurable broadcast and daisy chain modes.
• Common test data can be broadcasted to any combination of instruments in the IJTAG
network while the remaining instruments stay bypassed. SIBs do not change their
open/close states during the broadcast mode.
• Switching the network from broadcast mode to daisy mode results in a fixed length
daisy mode shift path configuration, each time. The resulting daisy chain configura-
tion after exiting the broadcast mode does not depend on the prior broadcast mode
configuration or the test data shifted during the last broadcast cycle.
• When this network is switched from broadcast to daisy mode, the resulting shift path
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is of the shortest length possible in the network. All the SIBs in the network reset
to their closed state when switching from broadcast to daisy mode. This reduces the
amount of time required to reconfigure the shift path for the next daisy mode operation
that follows the previous broadcast mode operation.
• The broadcast network architecture is scalable. During the design phase, the designer
does not have to identify the groups of clients that would receive broadcast data.
• The new broadcast network architecture supports hierarchy while maintaining the
above mentioned feature set.
• Similar to the traditional IJTAG network, the new broadcast network architecture can
interface with the TAP controller. Thus it can be used in any IEEE 1149.1-compliant
test architecture.
In the subsequent subsection we begin by describing our broadcast network design with
single level of hierarchy. This is followed by design improvements required to support hier-
archical broadcast networks.
6.1 Broadcast Network - Without Hierarchy
Fig. 6.1 shows a conceptual view of the new IJTAG broadcast network. The example
network is part of a cluster which is divided into three partitions—A, B, and C. Each partition
consists of a TDR and its corresponding SIB that is designed to support broadcast modes.
Compared to a regular serial IJTAG network with flat-architecture [8,14], the design consists
of an extra ScanMux per TDR. The broadcast_TDI signal can be routed along with other
control signals.
6.1.0.1 NIB as Partition Broadcast Control Bit (BCB)
The partition Broadcast Control Bit (BCB) at the cluster level is implemented using a
NIB. The 1-bit partition BCB-Out signal from the partition BCB feeds the select signal of
the scan-muxes in each partition. When the partition BCB asserts the BCB-Out signal,
the network switches to broadcast scan mode. When the BCB-Out signal is de-asserted,















































































































Figure 6.1: New IJTAG based reconfigurable broadcast network - Without hierarchy
partition BCB is also applied to the modified SIBs in the network. With reference to the
SIBs, the BCB-Out signal is referred to as SIB-Lock signal in this paper.
6.1.0.2 Broadcast Segment Insertion Bit
The modified SIB design used in the broadcast network of Fig. 6.1 is shown in Fig. 6.2.
Compared to the SIB design in Fig. 2.3, the broadcast SIB has some additional features—a
locked SIB state, a shift cell with a feedback path forced to zero during broadcast mode,
and a pipelined UpdateEn. In terms of area overhead, the broadcast SIB requires two extra
logic gates, and a pipeline flip-flop when compared to the SIB design in Fig. 2.3. These SIB
design features that enable efficient broadcast mode operations are described subsequently.
Locked SIB State: As mentioned earlier, the partition BCB-Out signal also serves as the
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Figure 6.2: Modified SIB design with SIB-Lock, pipelined UpdateEn, and forced shift cell
reset for the new configurable broadcast network
signal and the value in the update cell, the broadcast SIB shown in Fig. 6.2 can be in one
of four different states. These four SIB states and the corresponding SIB-Lock and update
cell values are give in Table 6.1.
During daisy (i.e. serial) mode, the SIB-Lock remains deasserted and the broadcast SIB
works similarly to the SIB shown in Fig. 2.3. When the SIB is closed (update cell = 0), the
corresponding TDR is bypassed. When the SIB is open (update cell = 1), the corresponding
TDR is active and connected to the active shift path in daisy scan mode. Before switching
to broadcast mode, in the last daisy shift operation each SIB is placed in an appropriate
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Table 6.1: Broadcast SIB States
SIB State SIB_Lock 
Update 
cell 
TDR Scan mode 
Closed and 
unlocked 
0 0 Bypass Daisy_Byp 
Open and 
unlocked 
0 1 Active Daisy 
Closed and 
locked 
1 0 Bypass Broadcast_Byp 
Open and 
locked 
1 1 Active Broadcast 
 
open or closed state, depending on the TDRs that need to receive the identical test data
during broadcast.
During broadcast mode the SIB-Lock signal remains asserted. This prevents the Upda-
teEn signal from reaching the update mux of the SIB and thus update operations cannot be
performed on the SIB. In other words, during the broadcast mode, the SIB does not change
its open/closed state. Without a lock, during the broadcast mode, all the broadcast SIBs
will switch between their open/closed states. Once the target TDRs have received the broad-
casted test data, the network can be switched back to daisy scan mode to reconfigure the
SIBs. To reduce the number of clock cycles that would be required to switch from broadcast
scan mode to daisy scan mode and reconfigure all the SIBs for the next broadcast/daisy
operation, we made two more changes to the SIB design—during broadcast mode the shift
cell’s feedback path is forced to zero and the UpdateEn signal to the SIB’s update mux is
pipelined.
Shift cell’s feedback path is forced to zero: When the network is switched from broadcast
to daisy mode, the SIBs that were open during the broadcast mode will add their corre-
sponding TDRs to the active shift path in daisy scan mode. Thus, the resulting shift path
will consist of all the TDRs that were receiving the broadcasted test data along with all
of the broadcast SIBs in the network. Unfortunately, any network reconfiguration, after
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switching from broadcast to daisy mode, would require shifting the new SIB configuration
data through the TDRs connected to the active shift path. This would result in longer
network reconfiguration overhead after each broadcast to daisy mode switch (depending on
the number and length of the TDRs that were receiving the broadcasted data.)
To avoid this, the SIBs are designed such that the feedback path of the shift cell is
forced to a zero during broadcast mode. Thus, when the broadcast mode ends and the
SIBs are unlocked, an UpdateDR operation would close all the SIBs in the network resulting
in minimal active shift path length. The network would now require fewer clock cycles to
reconfigure it for the next daisy scan mode operation.
However, it is important to note that, the IJTAG standard did not consider these type
of shift cell design modifications. Hence, an IJTAG compliant software might not be aware
of the forced reset of the shift cells. Thus, to maintain compliance with the IJTAG Std. and
the software, the last broadcast pattern should contain the broadcast SIB bit set to 0. Even
though, explicitly setting this broadcast bit to 0 is not required for the circuit to function
correctly. This is because, switching from broadcast mode to daisy mode will automatically
reset all the broadcast SIBs. Another solution is to inform the software about the forced
reset of the broadcast SIBs after switching from broadcast to daisy mode.
Pipelined UpdateEn signal: The network is switched from broadcast mode to daisy mode
by shifting a zero in the BCB and performing an UpdateDR. This UpdateDR operation
resets the BCB-Out/SIB-Lock signal, as shown by the red arrows in Fig. 6.3. As mentioned
earlier, the shift cells of all the SIBs contain a zero at this point. Now, after applying the
first UpdateDR to end the broadcast mode, a second UpdateDR will place a zero in the
update cells of all the broadcast SIBs. This will close all the SIBs to produce a minimal
length shift path. However, a second consecutive UpdateDR operation would require cycling
through the TAP controller’s Capture-Shift-Update states, denoted as TAP C in the top
half of Fig. 6.3.
To avoid these additional cycles, we have inserted a single flip-flop in the path of the
UpdateEn signal of all the broadcast SIBs in the broadcast network. The first UpdateDR
operation resets the BCB and deasserts the SIB-Lock signal. The corresponding timing
diagram is shown in the bottom half of Fig. 6.3. Now, when the delayed UpdateEn signal
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Figure 6.3: SIB unlock-update operations, with and without pipelined UpdateEn
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from the UpdateDR operation reaches the broadcast SIBs in the next clock cycle, the SIB-
lock signals for the broadcast SIBs are already zero—unlocking those SIBs. Thus, the delayed
UpdateEn signal propagates to the update cell and allows the zero currently in the shift cell
to be placed in the update cell on the next falling clock edge. This closes all the broadcast
SIBs. As a result, a single UpdateDR operation resets the BCB and closes all the SIBs in
two consecutive clock cycles. This, avoids the need to perform two consecutive UpdateDRs
as required in a design without pipelined UpdateEn signals to the broadcast SIBs.
Since the TAP controller has to cycle through its state machine for the Capture-Shift-
Update (CSU) signals, the delayed UpdateEn signal to the broadcast SIBs should be able
to update the broadcast SIBs before any other CSU signals arrive at the broadcast SIB or
the corresponding TDR.
6.2 Broadcast Network - With Hierarchy
Fig. 6.4 shows a conceptual view of the new IJTAG broadcast network with two levels
of hierarchy. The example network is a part of the chip level test network, which is divided
into three clusters—I, II, III. Each cluster may further consist of the cluster level broadcast
network (partition BCB and partitions A, B, C) shown in Fig. 6.1 along with the additional
broadcast SIB and scan mux per cluster as shown in Fig. 6.4. The broadcast SIBs (I, II, and
III) in Fig. 6.4 operate in a similar manner as the broadcast SIBs shown in Fig. 6.1.
6.2.0.1 Partition Broadcast Control Bit (BCB) with locked state
For the hierarchical broadcast network to operate as intended, it is important to add
locked states to the partition BCB of every cluster in the network. This is similar to the
locked state of the broadcast SIBs we discussed earlier. Further optimizations similar to the
broadcast SIB design, such as delayed UpdateEn and forced shift cell reset, can also be used.
6.2.0.2 Cluster Broadcast Control Bit (BCB)
The cluster BCB at the chip level is implemented using a NIB similar to the partition
BCB that we showed earlier in Fig. 6.1. The control signal from the cluster BCB generates
cluster BCB-Out and cluster SIB-Lock. The control signal also functions as the partition
BCB-Lock for the partition BCBs in the clusters.
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Figure 6.4: New IJTAG based reconfigurable broadcast network - With hierarchy
6.2.1 Test Time Improvements
The new broadcast network (shown in Fig. 6.1 without hierarchy and in Fig. 6.4 with
hierarchy), provides a trade-off between network reconfigurability and SIB (and NIB) pro-
gramming overhead. To evaluate this trade-off and test time improvements, we compare
four IJTAG networks using 8 32-bit TDRs shown in Fig. 6.5—a serial IJTAG network in (a),
prior broadcast networks in (b) and (c), and finally (d) based on our new broadcast network
(from Fig. 6.1). These 8 TDRs are part of two embedded cores. Because the new network
provides reconfigurable broadcast/daisy scan modes, these TDRs from the two embedded
cores do not need to be grouped in clusters in Fig. 6.5d as compared to Fig. 6.5 (b), and (c).
The total number of (SIBs+NIBs) in the networks shown in Fig. 6.5 (a), (b), (c), and (d)
are 8, 4, 10, and 9 respectively.








































Prior broadcast net  





Prior broadcast net  
































Prior broadcast net  





Prior broadcast net  















broadcast net based on the 
new network design in fig 6 
TDRs 1 to 8, 32-bits 
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Figure 6.5: Sample IJTAG networks used in Table 6.2
51
Table 6.2: No. of clock cycles required for read/write of test data using four different IJTAG
network designs.
Test Case Fig. 10a Fig. 10b Fig. 10c Fig. 10d 
Daisy_all 282 274 398 284 
Daisy_byp 154 274 210 156 
Broadcast_all 282 86 101 53 
Broadcast_byp 154 274 210 53 
 
TDRs are reported in Table 6.2. The reported values are calculated using the same method
that was used in [8, 14]. For each of the test cases the number of clock cycles are reported
assuming that the network was in reset state before the read/write operation. Thus, the
initial state of all the SIBs and NIBs was assumed to be closed. The test cases were chosen
to evaluate the networks in four different scan configurations—all 8 TDRs are in daisy
scan mode (Daisy_all), some TDRs are in daisy scan mode and remaining are bypassed
(Daisy_byp), all TDRs receive identical data (Broadcast_all), and finally some TDRs receive
identical data and remaining are bypassed (Broadcast_byp).
Daisy_all : This test case involves reading out data from all the TDRs. As mentioned
earlier, the IJTAG network in Fig. 6.5b has the lowest number of (SIBs+NIBs). Thus, it
requires the lowest test time for a Daisy_all operation. However, it is important to note
that the network clusters in Fig. 6.5b do not provide any reconfigurable daisy modes.
Daisy_byp: This test case involves reading out data from TDRs 1, 2, 5, and 6. The
networks in Fig. 6.5 (a) and (d) can reconfigure the network in daisy mode such that only
these four TDRs are active and the remaining TDRs are bypassed. The network in Fig. 6.5d
contains one extra shift bit (BCB) in the chain compared to Fig. 6.5a. This extra bit needs
to be shifted in the initial network reconfiguration step and while reading the TDRs 1, 2,
5, and 6. Thus, the new broadcast network requires two extra clock cycles compared to the
serial network. The network in Fig. 6.5b, does not contain any SIBs within the broadcast
clusters and thus it cannot reconfigure the active shift path during daisy scan mode. Also,
the network in Fig. 6.5c does not support any daisy scan mode and can only access one TDR
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at a time. Thus, both of these prior broadcast networks require 42% and 25% more clock
cycles, respectively.
Broadcast_all : This test case involves broadcasting data to all the TDRs. Now, even
though the network in Fig. 6.5b has low SIB programming overhead, having two separate
broadcast clusters results in 38% more test clock cycles compared to the new broadcast
network in Fig. 6.5d. Also, in Fig. 6.5b, without clusters, spanning multiple TDRs from
different embedded cores would result in very long daisy scan mode operations.
Broadcast_byp: This test case involves broadcasting test data to TDRs 1, 2, 5, and 6.
In this scenario, our new brodcast network can broadcast the identical test data to TDRs 1,
2, 5, and 6 by using its reconfigurable broadcast mode while keeping the remaining TDRs
bypassed. However, other networks do not provide this feature and will need to shift data




NEW LSIB KEY LOGIC CIRCUITS AND ANALYSIS
In [7], key bit locations were assumed to be present in the shift cells of the scan chain.
This gives an advantage to the attacker because the attacker can perform power analysis
attack without needing to bring the JTAG state machine out of the Shift DR state. If the
key bits are in the update cell, then the attacker would need to perform an Update DR after
shifting in the guessed key bits. Thus, to increase the time that an attacker would need to
investigate the network and the switching activity of the network with respect to various
input patterns, it is better to place the key bits in the update cells as shown in Fig. 2.5.
It was shown in [7] that a key of length 48-bits can provide reasonable protection to the
key logic circuit from brute force attacks based on the scan chain length and the scan shift
frequency. For a scan chain length of 5000 bits and scan shift frequency of 10 MHz and no
hierarchy (finding keys behind SIBs or LSIBs), the average amount of time required to find
the correct 48-bit key through brute force attacks was shown to be in the order of thousands
of years. Thus, in this paper, we chose to study keys 48 bits in length, although, our results
are applicable to keys of other lengths as well.
Our experimental circuits consist of a 48-bit scan path segment where the update cell
of every scan cell corresponds to the key bits of the LSIB key. The output of these update
cells is fed to various key logic designs. These key logic designs are meant to check the
key bit values in the updates cell against one or more than one possible correct keys. Each
circuit was synthesized to a gate-level netlist using 90nm design libraries. The VCD (Value
Change Dump) files generated after every simulation were processed to obtain the required
switching activity data. We assume that the attacker is able to measure dynamic switching
power corresponding to this switching activity of the circuit with good accuracy. We also
assume the same switching power for both 1 → 0 and 0 → 1 transitions in the circuit.
Finally, we assume that the update cells holding the key bits are not feeding data to any
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other circuits. Thus the assumptions made for our analysis represent the “best case” scenario
for the attacker.
To evaluate the susceptibility of key logic circuits to simple power analysis attacks we used
two different sets of input patterns, referred to in this paper as “walking-1" and “walking-0"
patterns. For an n-bit LSIB key Kn each set of walking-1 and walking-0 patterns contains n
different input patterns, each n-bits in length. In a set of n walking-1 patterns each pattern
is of hamming weight one; the first input pattern has a single bit set to a one in bit location
0, second pattern in bit location 1 and so on. Similarly, the set of walking-0 patterns can
be defined such that each pattern is a complement of the corresponding walking-1 pattern.
Thus, for an LSIB with 48-bit unlock key, 48 patterns constituting walking-1 (walking-0)
patterns were applied.
To measure the switching activity of the target circuit corresponding to a walking-1
(walking-0) pattern an attacker would need an appropriate background against which the
attacker would measure the difference in switching activity. We used switching activity of
the target circuit corresponding to an “all 0s” (or “all 1s”) pattern as a suitable background
against which the switching activity of the circuit for each of the walking-1 (or walking-
0) patterns was measured. Thus a pattern of all 0s (all 1s) was applied before applying
each walking-1 (walking-0) pattern. We measured the cumulative switching activity of the
key logic circuit for the clock cycle in which the circuit processed an input pattern. The
attacker would be interested in the power trace generated due to this switching activity. We
evaluate this switching activity data gathered using different attack patterns to assess the
susceptibility of the key logic circuits to power analysis attacks.
7.1 Key Logic 1 – AND-tree
This implementation is just a simple array of AND gates as the name suggests. The
array of AND gates is fed with the 48-bit data from the update cells holding the key bits.
The inverted output (QN) of the flip-flops from the update cells, that are supposed to hold
key bits whose correct value should be equal to a logic zero, is fed to the AND gate tree.
Thus, If the correct value of the key bits is placed in the update cells then the AND tree
will generate an Unlock signal. For an n-bit key of hamming weight j, there will be j update
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cells feeding their non-inverted output to the AND gate tree, and n-j update cells feeding
their inverted output to the AND gate tree. Fig. 7.1 shows an AND-tree based key logic for
an n-bit LSIB key.
Figure 7.1: Key logic 1 – AND-tree. Key length = n-bits. Hamming weight = j
The output of the update cells is applied to the AND gate tree in the same order as
they appear in the scan chain. Although the figure shows AND gate tree implemented using
two-input AND gates, AND gates of different fan-in sizes can be used as well.
We investigated susceptibility of this key logic circuit for LSIBs in an IEEE 1687 network
by using 1000 different instances of the circuit. Each circuit has a unique 48-bit long key
value that was randomly chosen with varying hamming distances. Switching activity of each
circuit was collected using walking-1 patterns, resulting in 48 data points for the 48 bit
locations of the LSIB key. Fig. 7.2 shows an example plot of the switching activity data
obtained by applying walking-1 patterns to one of the AND-tree based key logic circuit.
We analyzed the switching activity data obtained using the walking-1 patterns to deter-
mine if it is possible for the attacker to deduce the embedded LSIB key. On comparing the
switching activity values against each key bit value, following observations were made:
1. Pairs of the consecutive bit locations [n-(m+1)] and [n-(m+2)] in key Kn where m
ranges from (0, 2, 4, . . . , n-2), have same key bit value if the switching activity value
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Figure 7.2: Switching activity values and the corresponding key bit values for each bit
location of the LSIB key, obtained by applying walking-1 patterns. Hamming weight of the
LSIB key = 21. Pattern reference background = all zeros. Circuit = Key Logic 1 – AND-tree
for a single LSIB key.
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for the two locations is equal.
(a) All such consecutive pairs of key bits which belong to the subset of bit locations
with lowest switching activity value are set to a logic one in the LSIB key
(b) All remaining pairs are set to a logic zero in the LSIB key
2. Pairs of the consecutive bit locations [n− (m+ 1)] and [n− (m+ 2)] in key Kn where
m ranges from (0, 2, 4, . . . , n− 2), have different key bit values if the switching activity
values for the two locations are not equal. The bit location corresponding to the higher
switching activity value is set to a logic zero and the bit location corresponding to the
lower switching activity value is set to a logic one.
Using this correlation information between the switching activity data and the corre-
sponding key bit for each bit location of the LSIB keys, we programmatically extracted
correct value of the keys for all 1000 such key logic circuits implemented for single LSIB
keys.
It is important to note that even though the AND gate tree in this example consisted
of two-input AND gates, similar analysis can be done for an AND gate tree designed using
gates with higher fan-in values. For example, if the AND-tree is implemented using 3-
input AND gates, then similar analysis can be done by obtaining switching activity data
using “walking-pair-of-1’s” patterns. In this case values of the key bits can be deduced by
comparing switching activity value for three consecutive bit locations in the key.
7.2 Key Logic 1b – AND-tree with randomized key bit order
This key logic is a variation on the design of the Key Logic 1 – AND-tree described previ-
ously. In the previous design the switching activity values corresponding to the consecutive
bit locations could be correlated to the correct values of the key bits. This is because, in the
previous design the output of the update cells is applied to the AND gate tree in the same
order as they appear in the scan chain. To prevent this relationship between the consecutive
bit locations of the key, we modified the design by randomizing the order in which the output
of the update cells holding the key bits is applied to the AND gate tree.
We investigated susceptibility to power analysis attacks of this modified key logic design
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using the same 1000 keys as used in the previous investigation. Switching activity of each
circuit was collected using the walking-1 patterns, resulting in total 48 data points for the
48 bit locations of the LSIB key. Fig. 7.3 shows an example plot of this switching activity




Figure 7.3: Switching activity values and the corresponding key bit values for each bit
location of the LSIB key, obtained by applying walking-1 patterns. Hamming weight of the
LSIB key = 21. Reference background = all zeros. Circuit = Key Logic 1b – AND-tree with
randomized key bit order, for one LSIB key.
We analyzed the switching activity data obtained using walking-1 patterns to determine
if it is possible for the attacker to deduce the embedded LSIB key for this key logic design.
The key bits were divided into separate sets based on their corresponding switching activity
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values obtained. Key bits corresponding to equal switching activity values were placed in
same groups, marked as group I, II, and III in Fig. 7.3. The key bit values were recovered
using following procedure:
1. Group-I (pink box): Find key bit locations set to a logic zero in the LSIB key–In the
walking-0 patterns, set one bit-location from Group-I to a logic zero and walk a zero
through rest of the bit locations from Group-I. The pair of bit locations that produces
highest switching activity value, during this walking-0 test, is set to a logic zero in
the LSIB key. Repeat this step for all remaining bit locations in Group-I. During this
process, bit locations set to a logic 1 in the LSIB key, will produce lower switching
value than the original switching value of the bit locations in this group. Thus, key bit
values for all the bit locations in the Group-I can be obtained.
2. Group-II (blue box): Find key bit locations set to a zero in the LSIB key–The process
is same as Group-I.
3. Group-III (green box): Find key bit locations set to a logic one in the LSIB key–In the
walking-1 patterns, set one bit-location from group-III to a logic one, and walk a one
through rest of the bit locations in group-III. The pair of bit locations which produces
highest switching activity, during this walking-1 test, is set to a logic one. Repeat this
step for every bit location in group-III. During this process, bit locations set to a logic
zero in the LSIB key will not change their switching activity value
Thus, the correct key for this key logic circuit can be recovered when the key logic is
implemented for a single LSIB key. Even though this investigation and analysis was done for
key logic with two-input AND gates, the same procedure is also applicable for AND gates
with higher fan-in values. For example, if 3-input AND gates are used, then using walking-
pair-of-1’s and walking-pair-of-0’s patterns the LSIB key can be recovered by following the
procedure just discussed.
7.3 Key Logic 1c – Gate-tree with Compiler Optimizations
The previous key logic circuits were designed manually and synthesized using a suitable
standard cell library without any compiler optimizations for area or power. We re-synthesized
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the 1000 circuits from “Key Logic 1a – AND-tree” using the same standard cell library while
keeping the compiler optimizations enabled. An example synthesized circuit obtained using
area optimizations is shown in Fig. 7.4.
Figure 7.4: Key logic 1c – Compiler synthesized gate-tree. LSIB key length = 48-bits.
Hamming weight = j
We investigated susceptibility of this key logic design to power analysis attacks by using
the same 1000 keys used in the previous investigations. Switching activity of each circuit
was collected using both the walking-1 and walking-0 patterns. Fig. 7.5 shows an example
plot of the data obtained by applying the walking-1 patterns.
From Fig. 7.5 it can be observed that an attacker can deduce the key bits that are
set to a logic zero in the LSIB key by using the bit locations that show switching activity
values higher than a certain threshold (marked with a dotted green line in this example).
Similarly, using the switching data obtained by applying the walking-0 patterns, an attacker
can deduce the key bits that are set to a logic one. Thus, by using the walking-1 and walking-
0 patterns, an attacker can recover most of the key bit values. The bit locations that give
the same switching activity for both the walking-1 and walking-0 patterns, can be recovered
using brute force attacks quickly. The average coefficient of determination (R2) between the
switching activity values when walking-1 patterns are applied and the LSIB’s key bit values
for this design is 0.54.
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Figure 7.5: Switching activity values and the corresponding key bit values for each bit
location of the LSIB key, obtained by applying walking-1 patterns. Hamming weight of the
LSIB key = 21. Reference background = all zeros. Circuit = Key Logic 1c – Gate-tree with
compiler optimizations, for one LSIB key.
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7.4 Mitigate Power Analysis Attacks by Sharing Key Bit Flip-Flops Among
Multiple LSIBs
The key logic circuits discussed until now were implemented to generate an Unlock signal
for a single LSIB. If this approach is used, then every LSIB will have its separate key logic
circuit that utilizes a separate set of update cells for key bits. Another way to implement this
key logic based security for LSIBs is to share the same set of update cells (holding key bits)
among key logic circuits of multiple LSIBs. Thus, this set of update cells feeds its output to
multiple key logic circuits, or in other words – key logic circuits from multiple LSIBs share
the same input key bit flip-flops.
This can also be considered as designing a single key logic circuit with multiple embedded
LSIB keys that generates separate Unlock signals for each of the multiple LSIBs. This
obviously reduces the number of update cells required to hold the key bits. Since output
from the same set of update cells is fed to the key logic circuits of multiple LSIBs, placing any
new key value in these update cells will cause the key logic circuits to switch simultaneously.
Simultaneous switching of multiple key logic circuits will naturally obfuscate the switching
activity of any individual key logic.
To evaluate susceptibility of the key logic circuits towards simple power analysis attacks,
we implemented designs with four key logic circuits sharing the same key bit flip-flops. 1000
such circuit instances were generated with unique 48-bit LSIB keys of varying hamming
weights and synthesized using standard cell library. Compiler optimizations flags similar
to Key Logic 1c were enabled during synthesis. Switching activity data was gathered by
applying the walking-1 patterns to all the 1000 instances of the circuits with four keys. Due
to the simultaneous switching of multiple key logic circuits, the switching activity value for
each walking-1 pattern depends on the bit values of all four LSIB keys at that binary location.
We refer to the sum of bits at each of the 48 bit locations of the keys as “key-bitsum”.
An example bar plot with the switching activity data, obtained by applying walking-1
patterns to a circuit with four LSIB keys, plotted against the key-bitsum values for each key
bit location is shown in Fig. 7.6. In this case the switching activity has no direct correlation to
the key-bitsum values or the bit values for the individual LSIB keys. The average coefficient
of determination (R2) between the switching activity values and the key-bitsum values for
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this design is 0.05.
Figure 7.6: Switching activity values and the corresponding key-bitsum values for each bit
location of the LSIB keys, obtained by applying walking-1 patterns. Hamming weights of
keys: LSIB1 = 32, LSIB2 = 13, LSIB3 = 37, LSIB4 = 30. Pattern reference background
= all zeros. Circuit = Key Logic 1c – Gate-tree with compiler optimizations, for four LSIB
keys.
7.5 Key Logic with Programmable LSIB-Keys
The key logic circuits discussed in previous sections had their LSIB keys embedded in
their design. This embedded key was effected due to the inverted and non-inverted outputs
of the update cell flip-flops fed to the AND gate tree. If the LSIB key is same for every
die of an IC, then it provides an advantage to the attacker. An attacker can obtain several
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copies of the target IC and then implement a distributed guided brute force attack on them
simultaneously to recover the LSIB key. This would reduce the time required to obtain the
key by a huge factor, since the effort of applying all the generated guess key patterns will
be divided among multiple ICs in time. To avoid this scenario, the LSIB keys should be
made different for each die. Another option is to make those keys programmable through
EEPROM. A key logic circuit that provides an option to use different LSIB keys for each
die or use programmable keys through EEPROM is show in Fig. 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Key logic 3 – Key logic with programmable LSIB Unlock key. LSIB key length
= 48-bits. Hamming weight = j
7.6 Key Logic with Brute Force Attack Detection
Fig. 7.8 shows an example circuit that detects if a wrong LSIB key is placed in the update
cells (update cells that hold key bits), and based on this detection prevents the UpdateEn
signal to these Update cells and thus locking these Update cells. The UpdateEn signal to the
key bit Update cells is disabled until a reset signal is applied to the device. It is important
that an authorized user can use the IEEE 1687 network without applying a correct key
(causing one of the LSIBs to open) each time. To avoid this, a redundant key logic circuit
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is added to the design which shares the same input data (output from the key bit flip-flops)
as the other four key logic circuits as show in Fig. 7.8. Thus, with this design an authorized
user can use the IEEE 1687 network without inadvertently locking the Update cells holding
the key bits by using the correct key for the redundant key logic.
Figure 7.8: Circuit to detect brute force attack on LSIB key logics with shared key bit flip
flops, and gate UpdateEn signal to the Update cells holding LSIB key bits. Key length =
n-bits . Hamming weights of keys : LSIB1 = j, LSIB2 = k, LSIB3 = l, LSIB4 = m, redundant
key = z.
The output of the key logic circuits sharing the same key bit flip flops is fed to an OR
gate, and the output of the OR gate is used to gate the UpdateEn signal to the Update cells
holding key bits. Thus, if any of the five correct keys (4 LSIB keys and one redundant key) is
placed in the key bits, it will prevent the Update cells from getting locked. When an attacker
applies wrong guess keys during a brute force attack, this design will lock the Update cells.
Thus, forcing the attacker to reset the circuit each time resulting in much longer time for
a successful brute force attack, including brute force attacks guided using the information
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obtained through power analysis attacks.
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Chapter 8
HOW TO COLOR A MAP AND SIMULTANEOUSLY REDUCE TEST POWER
As discussed earlier, increasing SoC complexity has resulted in a dramatic increase in
the number of scan flip-flops. Thus, resulting in a large test pattern volume. To reduce
test times, modern DFT architectures support shifting test data in parallel to different SoC
partitions. However, this comes at a cost. Shifting test data in parallel results in excessive
simultaneous switching activity—well beyond the functional specifications of the design.
To reduce peak test power, an SoC can be divided into different blocks and tested sepa-
rately [62]. One common solution is to include multiple clock domains, separate test clocks,
and multiple free-running clocks in the SoC for testing [63, 64]. A problem that arises here
is that multiple test clocks also result in complex test-clock distribution designs. Each test
clock would also require an extra package pin. As discussed in [65], adding extra package
pin for each test clock is very difficult, especially in 2.5D/3D ICs [66,67].
One potential solution to the problem of using multiple test clocks without increasing
extra package pin for each test clock is to apply a single test clock to the SoC and derive
multiple test clocks inside each block [68]. However, if all the derived test clocks are in
phase then it will result in the simultaneous toggling of all the clock domains. This will
again cause a large number of scan flip-flops to toggle simultaneously when the test data is
scanned in. Thus, resulting in a very high peak test power compared to the functional mode
specifications. Higher than functional mode peak power will cause excessive Power Supply
Noise (PSN), and potentially corrupt flip-flop states—resulting in test failures. This also
results in circuit slowdowns during test.
The above mentioned potential problem that may arise due to the use of multiple test
clocks (shift clocks in this case) that are derived from a single test clock can be resolved by
staggering the derived clocks during shift cycles [65]. Thus if all of the derived shift clocks
have different duty cycles and/or clock phases, the simultaneous switching of scan flip-flops
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during shift can be reduced. The shift clocks of different phases derived from the single
test clock are referred to as stagger values in the literature. These values are assigned to
different SoC blocks such that no two adjacent blocks receive the same stagger value. Thus,
the scan chains in any two adjacent blocks should not toggle simultaneously if the stagger
value assignment is done correctly. A new problem that arise here is that the number of
staggered values (derived shift clocks) is bounded due to the number of possible/available
clock phases. However, an SoC may contain several hundreds of blocks/partitions. This
problem of assigning small number of stagger values to a large number of SoC blocks to
minimize toggle activity during test data scan was first studied in [65], and referred to as
Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment (SCSA).
In [65], a heuristics based approach was proposed to perform faster but sub-optimal
SCSA compared to their own mathematical model that produced optimal assignments and
required higher computational times. However, this heuristics based method resulted in
conflicts and in certain cases neighboring partitions received the same stagger values. Also,
their mathematical model based programs did not run to completion in certain test cases
involving larger designs with many partitions. In this chapter we discuss our own novel
approach to solve the SCSA problem that provides an optimal assignment without requiring
higher computational times compared to the methods proposed in in [65]. The remainder of
this chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 discusses prior work related to shift-clock
staggering and SCSA. Section 8.2 gives background information regarding map coloring and
describes how SCSA problem is related to the map coloring problem. Section 8.3 discusses the
new planar graph coloring algorithm for SCSA, and finally Section 8.4 presents experimental
results.
8.1 Prior Work
As described in [65], SoC designs use a single input clock from the Automatic Test
Equipment (ATE) as the shift clock. This ATE clock is applied to each block inside the
SoC. A clock divider in each block generates local test clocks. Test patterns to the de-
compressors and from the compressors of each SoC block are driven in series using the ATE
clock. Inside each block, the scan chains between the de-compressor and compressor logic
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 Figure 8.1: Staggered Test Clocks.
are shifted using the locally generated clocks. Staggering of the shift clock at each block
level was proposed in [65]. These stagger values should be generated locally in each block
such that no two adjacent blocks use that same stagger value (conflict free). This is the
Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment (SCSA) problem. Thus, no two adjacent blocks sharing
the same power rail will toggle simultaneously when the decompressed test data is shifting
through their internal scan chains. An example of the different staggered clock phases is
shown in Fig. 8.1.
Previously proposed solutions used integer linear programming (ILP) to obtain optimal
SCSA results. However, the assignment does not always produce conflict free results. These
conflicts were resolved based on the length of the shared boundary between two adjacent
blocks. If the shared boundary’s length between two adjacent blocks was below a certain
threshold then the algorithm proceeded with the assignment even if the two blocks received
the same stagger value. Another drawback of this solution is that it takes large computational
time to execute. In certain cases with very large designs (500 to 600 SoC blocks) and 0
threshold value the ILP method didn’t terminate when assigning 8 different stagger values.
In medium sized designs (60 to 70 SoC blocks) with 0 threshold value, the ILP method
finished executing. For example, SoC with 62 blocks resulted in 10 conflicts when assigning
4 different stagger values to the SoC blocks.
Another previously proposed solution is based on heuristics. This solution reduces CPU
time by more than 3-4 times. However, it results in higher conflicts when assigning stag-
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ger values as compared to the ILP method. SoC with 62 blocks and 0 threshold value
resulted in 13 conflicts when assigning 4 different stagger values using the heuristics method.
Also, because this solution is based on heuristics that involves choosing partitions randomly
for SCSA, it produced a different SCSA result on each execution with different amount of
conflicts. Thus, it would require to be executed a few times until an acceptable SCSA is
obtained.
Thus, a solution that provides conflict free SCSA results without using excessive compu-
tation time is required. We designed a new planar graph coloring algorithm that provides
guaranteed conflict free assignments when using 6 stagger values with 0 threshold. For
medium to small sizes, our new algorithm can provide conflict free assignment using 4-5
stagger values and 0 threshold. In the subsequent sections we discuss some relevant back-
ground information regarding map coloring followed by the description of our new planar
graph coloring algorithm.
8.2 Background: Planar Map Coloring
As discussed earlier, the SCSA problem involves assigning a limited number of the avail-
able stagger values to the SoC blocks such that no two adjacent blocks receive the same
stagger value. This is similar to the classical map coloring problem in which different regions
on a map are to be colored using a limited set of colors such that no two neighboring regions
are assigned the same color. For the SCSA problem, the set of different stagger values is
similar to the set of colors in the map coloring problem. Fig. 8.2 shows a colored partition
level layout of an SoC. Here each color represents a different stagger value. In the rest of
this text we will use the terms colors and stagger values interchangeably.
Planar map coloring problem has been studied by several generations of mathematicians
and computer scientists. The most important planar map coloring theorem is called the
four-color theorem. According to the four-color theorem: "The regions of any simple planar
map can be colored with only four colors, in such a way that any two adjacent regions have
different colors" [69–71]. However, SCSA problem does not limit to four colors and neither
does it try to use the fewest possible colors (stagger values). For SCSA the challenge is use










Figure 8.2: Colored partitions on an SoC – Colors here represent the stagger values used for
Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment
feature would be to balance the usage of all the available colors. This is to make sure that
an almost equal number of non-neighboring partitions on the SoC shift test data at the same
time. Thus, this will also prevent a scenario where a single color has been used more than
the other available colors causing excessive number of partitions to switch simultaneously
during shift.
To solve the SCSA problem we have designed a new planar graph coloring algorithm.
Before introducing the new algorithm we first discuss how a planar map relates to a planar
graph. A graph consists of points (vertices) and lines (edges). The vertices on the graph
are connected to each other using edges. Simply, a graph is considered to be planar if it’s
possible to draw the graph such that no two edges cross over each other. Every planar map
can be drawn as a planar graph using the concept of duality.
If every region on a planar map is drawn as a vertex and if the shared boundaries between
any two regions on the map is represented using an edge between their two corresponding
vertices then the resulting planar graph is the dual of the map. Now, any coloring operation
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 Figure 8.3: Planar graph Obtained from the US Map
that’s done on the vertices of this planar graph will also be applicable to the original planar
map. It is important to note that in our analysis we have also considered a shared point
between two regions on the map as a valid shared boundary, and used it to draw edges while
generating our planar graphs from maps.
The planar graph shown in Fig. 8.3 is obtained from the US map using the duality
concept. The actual state names corresponding to the vertex labels used in Fig. 8.3 are
given in Table 8.1. More details about this table are given in the following subsection.
8.2.1 Sequential Coloring
Sequential coloring is a popular method of solving graph coloring problems. Sequential
coloring is a two step process. The first steps involves determining a specific coloring sequence
of the vertices in the graph. The second step involves a greedy coloring process to color these
ordered vertices. As discussed in [72], several sequential coloring algorithms such as Largest
First (LF), Smallest Last (SL), and Saturation Largest First(SLF)/DSATUR have been
proposed in the literature. Each of these algorithms provide different trade-offs between
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run-time, memory requirement, and coloring results.
The Smallest Last (SL) coloring algorithm guarantees conflict free coloring of a planar
graph in at most six colors [73,74]. Also, this algorithm can be further enhanced to provide a
linear time 5-coloring of any planar graph [75]. The basic principle of SL coloring algorithm is
that the vertices with few neighbors should be colored as late as possible. The SL algorithm
optimally colors trees, cycles, unicyclic graphs, wheels, complete bipartite graphs, Johnson’s
graphs and Mycielski’s graphs as reported in [72]. As discussed earlier, this sequential
algorithm is also a two step process. The first step is to generate an ordered set of the vertices
to determine the sequence in which they will be colored. Second step involves greedy coloring
these ordered vertices. The ordering used here is called smallest-last ordering. This ordering
makes sure that the vertices with the most potential to create conflicts during greedy coloring
are colored first, and the vertices with fewer neighbors (thus, fewer conflicts) get colored as
late as possible. Because the SL algorithm provides optimal coloring of planar graphs and
uses at most 6 (or in certain cases 5), we chose smallest-last ordering for our new planar
graph coloring algorithm. We now introduce the procedure for the smallest-last ordering of
the vertices.
In a graph, the number of neighbors of a vertex is called the degree of the vertex. The
smallest-last ordering involves sequentially “deleting” vertices from the graph starting with
the vertex of the smallest degree. Each time a vertex is removed from the graph the degrees
of all its neighbors are updated (decreased by 1). The deleted vertex is stored in a separate
set. The process is terminated once all the vertices in the graph are deleted. At the end of
this process, the set containing all the deleted vertices from the graph forms the ordered set
of vertices used during coloring. This set represents the smallest-last ordering of the vertices.
As an example, in Table 8.1 we provide an ordered set of the vertices from the planar
graph (of the US map) shown in Fig. 8.3. In this table, the order number denotes the
ordering of the vertices. Thus, according to this table, the vertex ’v42 Tennessee’ is first in
the ordered set and the vertex ’v11 Hawaii’ is last in the ordered set. Deletion degree (Del.
Deg.) in the table denotes the degree of the vertex when it was being deleted from the graph.
Thus, we can see from the table that the vertices with the smallest degrees (v11 Hawaii and
v1 Alaska) were deleted first. Because these two vertices were not connected to any other
74
vertices in the graph, degrees of other vertices remained unchanged upon their deletion. This
was followed by the deletion of the vertex ’v19 Maine’ of the smallest degree in the graph,
and upon its deletion the degree of its neighbor ’v29 New Hampshire’ was decreased by one.
This process was repeated until all the vertices in the graph were deleted and added to this
table. In the next section we discuss our new planar graph coloring algorithm that uses the
ordered set of vertices obtained using smallest-last ordering.
8.3 New Planar Graph Coloring Algorithm for Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment
The challenges associated with the graph coloring problem for Shift-Clock Stagger Assign-
ment are a bit different than the problems associated with the classical sequential coloring
problems. Graph coloring algorithms are designed to minimize the number of unique colors
that are required to color the graph without conflicts. These algorithms are not bounded
by hardware design constraints such as power. Also, these algorithm do not attempt to
balance the number of disjoint vertices that are assigned the same color. Considering these
limitations of the existing algorithms and challenges associated with hardware design we
worked on a new graph coloring algorithm. These are some of the salient features of our
algorithm when compared to the SL coloring algorithm and the existing SCSA algorithms
in the literature:
• If provided by the user during execution, our algorithm uses all the available colors
(stagger values) during the coloring procedure.
• The utilization of all the available colors (stagger values) is kept balanced. That is, if
a color is assigned to m vertices in the graph, then the algorithm assigns each of the
remaining other (n−1) colors to (m±1) vertices from the graph as well. Naturally, the
±1 value depends on whether the total number of vertices v in the graph is divisible
by the total number of n colors or not.
• If the user does not provide the total number of available colors then the algorithm
tries to minimize the number of unique colors required to color the graph. Thus, in
accordance with the SL coloring algorithm this number is at most going to be 6 for
planar graphs. However, the utilization of all the colors is still kept balanced.
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Table 8.1: Smallest Last Ordering of the Vertices from the US Planar Graph in Fig. 8.3.
Deletion degree (Del. Deg.) in the table shows the degree of the vertex when it was deleted
from the graph during smallest-last ordering. Order number shows the order in which vertices
get colored—from 0 to 50. DC is included; total vertices = 51.
Order No. Del Deg. Vertex Label Order No. Del Deg. Vertex Label
0 8 v42 Tennessee 26 7 v43 Texas
1 9 v25 Missouri 27 6 v33 North Carolina
2 9 v17 Kentucky 28 7 v10 Georgia
3 7 v15 Iowa 29 6 v0 Alabama
4 8 v27 Nebraska 30 7 v24 Mississippi
5 8 v41 South Dakota 31 6 v18 Louisiana
6 8 v50 Wyoming 32 6 v22 Michigan
7 9 v5 Colorado 33 6 v34 North Dakota
8 8 v3 Arkansas 34 6 v37 Oregon
9 9 v36 Oklahoma 35 6 v4 California
10 8 v16 Kansas 36 6 v32 New York
11 8 v44 Utah 37 5 v30 New Jersey
12 8 v31 New Mexico 38 6 v8 Delaware
13 8 v2 Arizona 39 6 v21 Massachuset
14 8 v12 Idaho 40 5 v45 Vermont
15 8 v28 Nevada 41 5 v29 New Hampshire
16 8 v13 Illinois 42 5 v6 Connecticut
17 8 v46 Virginia 43 4 v39 Rhode Island
18 7 v48 West Virginia 44 4 v40 South Carolina
19 7 v20 Maryland 45 4 v47 Washington
20 8 v38 Pennsylvania 46 4 v7 DC
21 8 v35 Ohio 47 4 v9 Florida
22 7 v26 Montana 48 2 v19 Maine
23 7 v14 Indiana 49 0 v1 Alaska
24 6 v23 Minnesota 50 0 v11 Hawaii
25 7 v49 Wisconsin
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• In some test cases our algorithm used fewer unique colors when compared to the SL
algorithm.
• As compared to the SCSA method discussed in [65], our algorithm provides conflict
free assignments when using 5-6 stagger values for larger (600+ partitions) designs and
4-5 stagger values for smaller (50+ partitions) designs.
During the coloring procedure, the set of unique colors is always ordered based on the
number of times a color is assigned to the vertices in the graph. Based on this parameter
the colors are arranged in an ascending order. Thus, the color that is assigned to the fewest
vertices is first in this ordered set of colors and the color that is assigned to the most vertices
is last in this order. We simply refer to this as the ordered set of colors in this chapter. Steps
involved in the new planar graph coloring algorithm are as follows:
Input: Smallest-last Ordering of the vertices (ordered vertex set), ordered set of
unique colors
Output: Colored planar graph with balanced utilization of all the colors
while Number of vertices in the ordered vertex set != 0 do
Current vertex v = Pick the first vertex from the ordered set of vertices;
Current color c = Pick the first color from the ordered set of colors;
while True do
if If any neighbor of the current vertex v is colored with c already then
New current color c = Pick the next color from the ordered set of colors;
else




Ordered set of colors = Re-order the set of colors based on the number of times
each color is used for vertex coloring.;
Remove the current vertex v from the ordered set of vertices;
end
Figure 8.4: New Planar Graph Coloring Algorithm for Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment
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 Red = 13 vertices 
Blue = 12 vertices 
Green = 13 vertices 
Orange =13 vertices 
(Includes DC) 
Figure 8.5: US planar graph colored using the algorithm shown in Fig. 8.4. Case (a): No
color set provided by the user. Smallest-last ordering used for this algorithm is given in
Table 8.1
The above algorithm can be modified to handle the condition where the set of colors are
not provided. In this case the algorithm will add a new color to the set of unique colors
each time when it cannot color a vertex with the existing set of colors without conflict. This
change will be similar to the existing smallest-last coloring algorithm from the literature.
8.4 SCSA Results Using New Planar Graph Coloring Algorithm
As discussed earlier, the Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment problem for low power SoC
testing is same as the map coloring problem with some additional hardware constraints. So
to evaluate the efficiency of the new graph coloring algorithm we used the US map as a
sample test case. The smallest-last ordering shown in Table 8.1 for the graph in Fig. 8.3 was
provided as an input to the algorithm in Fig. 8.4. We ran the C++ implementation of our
algorithm with the following two configurations: (a) zero colors provided by the user, and
(b) 5 colors provided by the user. We also ran the C++ implementation of the smallest-last
coloring algorithm [73,74] on this graph, this is discussed under case (c).
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Figure 8.6: Color utilization results for the US graph shown in Fig. 8.3 using our new
graph coloring algorithm Fig. 8.4 (cases a and b), and using the smallest-last/SL coloring
algorithm from literature (case c). Smallest-last ordering used for both the algorithms is
given in Table 8.1. Case (a): No color set provided by the user. Case (b): New algorithm
executed using 5 available colors. Case (c): SL coloring algorithm
Case (a): The algorithm ran to completion and required only 4 colors to color the entire
map. This is optimal coloring and in accordance with the four-color theorem discussed
earlier. The coloring result for this case is shown in Fig. 8.5. As we can see in Fig. 8.5, the
graph is optimally colored using four-colors without any conflicts. Colors red, green, and
orange were used to color 13 vertices each. Blue color was used to assign colors to 12 vertices
on the graph. This is because the total number of 51 vertices is not completely divisible by
4 available colors.
Thus, the utilization of all the four colors (red, blue, green, and orange) is balanced and
optimal. Color utilization for this test case is also shown in Fig. 8.6.
Case (b): The program was executed again but this time the user provided 5 total
available colors as an input along with the ordered vertex set shown in Table 8.1. Color
utilization for this test case is shown in Fig. 8.6. As we can see in Fig. 8.6, for case (b),
utilization of all the 5 colors (red, blue, green, orange, and brown) is balanced.
Case (c): In this test the US graph in Fig. 8.3 was colored using the smallest-last (SL)
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coloring algorithm from [73, 74]. Color utilization for this test case is shown in Fig. 8.6.
The SL coloring algorithm uses greedy coloring and picks the first available color to color
a vertex. This results in the over-utilization of the first color in the set of colors and the
utilization gradually decreases for the other colors in the set. Thus, as seen in Fig. 8.6, for
case (c), the red color (first color int the set) is used 19 times, followed by the blue, green,
and orange colors utilized for 13, 14, and 5 times respectively. If this algorithm is used for
the Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment problem, then a much higher number of partitions will
shift test data for the first stagger value and very few partitions will shift test data using
the fourth stagger value. Even though this algorithm resolves SCSA conflicts and prevents
neighboring partitions from shifting test data at the same time, it does not balance the




This research focused on improving SoC test networks for bandwidth, security, and power.
We explored IJTAG test network designs for bandwidth and security improvements. To re-
duce peak power consumption during test we also proposed a novel graph coloring algorithm
for Shift-Clock Stagger Assignment. In general, this algorithm also provides some useful
feature enhancements over classical sequential graph coloring algorithms from the literature.
For bandwidth improvements, We have introduced multiple types of parallel SIBs and
parallel IJTAG networks optimized for bandwidth, area, and/or security. We have shown
that parallel SIB-based networks can significantly increase the test bandwidth with no in-
crease in the SIB programming overhead (i.e. the clock cycles needed to shift through closed
SIBs while accessing an instrument). Additional overhead can be saved by reducing the
number of Update cells used for the Parallel-SIB design to 1. When test I/O is limited, a
broadcast mode with addressable SIBs can add significant test bandwidth and lower SIB
overhead at the cost of disjoint instrument access.
Furthermore, for bandwidth improvements, we introduced a new IJTAG based broadcast
network architecture to improve the test data write times for multiple identical embedded
cores. We have shown that the new broadcast network is scalable and it does not require
careful design time considerations regarding the instruments that should be collected to-
gether in a broadcast group. Our Broadcast Control Bit (BCB) and modified broadcast SIB
designs enable efficient hierarchical broadcast networks. We made further optimizations to
our broadcast SIB design to reduce the overhead required to program the SIBs and recon-
figure the network when switching from broadcast to daisy modes. Compared to a serial
IJTAG network, our design requires only one additional scan-mux, two extra logic gates and
an extra delay flip-flop per TDR in the network. In our sample test scenario we showed
that by making use of its reconfigurable broadcast mode our broadcast network dramati-
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cally reduced test time up to 65-80% clock cycles compared to IJTAG based serial and prior
broadcast networks.
The security of parallel IJTAG networks protected by locking parallel SIBs was also
investigated. Although one might intuitively think that security would be compromised
with the ability to scan key data into the network in parallel, the number of guesses required
still grows exponentially with key size. Shorter chain lengths in the parallel case (and thus
a smaller cost of a guess) when some of the SIBs are open can be counteracted with slightly
larger keys. In addition, when all of the SIBs are closed, the chain lengths of both networks
are identical, and the cost of a guess is thus the same as well. However, more cells are active
on the chain in the parallel case, providing more possible key bit locations when all SIBs are
closed. We showed that a 56-bit key in a 256-bit long parallel scan chain shifted at 10 MHz
requires over 60,000 years on average for a successful brute force attack. Distributing the
keys and LSIBs across a parallel hybrid network increases the time required even further to
118,000 years on average.
We also showed how combinational key logic circuit for a single LSIB may be defeated
with simple power analysis attacks. However, sharing key bits among multiple LSIBs can
obfuscate the power signature of the individual LSIB keys while reducing the number of key
bit holding flip-flops required. Specifically, we showed that combining 4 LSIB keys into a
single key logic circuit that would generate 4 separate Unlock signals for 4 different LSIBs
provides good obfuscation of the switching data (avg. R2 of 0.05) and reduces the required
number of key bit Update cells by a factor of 4, as compared to 4 separate key logic circuits
designed for a single LSIB (avg. R2 of 0.54). These changes can be easily implemented and
evaluated by a designer at an early design phase. In the future, we will explore methods
such as differential power analysis attacks on the LSIB key logic.
Finally, to reduce peak test power (due to the simultaneous switching of scan flip-flops
in neighboring partitions) while shifting parallel test data through the internal scan chains
of multiple SoC partitions, we worked on a novel solution for the Shift-Clock Stagger As-
signment (SCSA) problem. We identified the SCSA problem as a map coloring problem and
designed a novel planar graph coloring algorithm to solve it. Our algorithm provides several
improvements over the existing SCSA solutions in the literature. Compared to the existing
82
solutions, our algorithm provides guaranteed conflict free assignments using 6/5 stagger val-
ues (colors) regardless of the number of partitions in the SoC layout. The utilization of the
stagger values is balanced. Thus, it also results in an equal number of partitions switching
during scan shift. In some cases, our algorithm requires fewer unique colors to color a planar
graph compared to the smallest-last coloring algorithm in the literature. Also, our algorithm
can accept an arbitrary number of unique colors (less than or equal to the number of vertices
to be colored), and utilize all of them in a balanced manner.
The bandwidth, security, and peak test power improvements and designs discussed in
this dissertation are not interdependent on each other. Almost all of the proposed solutions
can be independently implemented in an SoC test design. However, these solutions are
not mutually exclusive either. If required, all or a combination of the designs/solutions
from this work can be implemented in an SoC design. For example, the new IJTAG based
broadcast design can be implemented at chip/partition level. Test network security can be
improved using the secure IJTAG mechanisms discussed in this work. Finally, peak test
power consumption while shifting test data in parallel to multiple SoC partitions can be
reduced using our novel graph coloring algorithm for SCSA.
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